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ABSTRACT
Essays on Banks’ and Consumers’ Behavior in the Presence of
Government as the Credit Insurer of Last Resort. (August 2011)
Shuoxun Zhang, B.A., Wuhan University;
B.S.,Wuhan University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan
My dissertation investigates the behavior of consumers and banks in the presence
of government as the credit insurer of last resort. Consumers have an option to file
for bankruptcy under law when there are unexpected adverse shocks, while banks,
especially large banks, are supported by the government during financial crisis because
of systemic risk. I explore the heterogeneous behavior among consumers and banks
with adverse shocks.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, my inquiry focuses on the heterogeneous
behavior of households in filing for bankruptcy. In the literature, there are two
theories in explaining personal bankruptcy: adverse event theory and strategic timing
theory. Fay, Hurst and White(FHW) 2002(AER) include both financial benefit and
adverse event variables in explaining the bankruptcy decision, and they find only
financial benefit from filing is significant in explaining whether to file or not. Our
argument is that adverse events may not work directly on bankruptcy decisions,
however, they operate by running a higher amount of debt. Thus FHW’s setting
may not be appropriate. Instead, adverse event consumers’ debt occurs after adverse
events, while strategic timing consumers’ debt decision and bankruptcy decision are
jointly determined, which means their debt or financial benefit is endogenous; thus we
propose that the endogeneity test of financial benefit is a way to distinguish the two
types of consumers. Assuming only one type exists in the sample, we find support
iv
for adverse event theory. Extending the analysis to allow for both adverse events
and strategic timing consumers shows existence of both types of filers, and strategic
timing filers are more sensitive to financial benefit. Additionally, lower access to debt
markets and lower income significantly increase the chance of strategic behavior.
The second part of my dissertation is to study the effectiveness of the Troubled
Asset Relief Program(TARP) on banks’ loan to asset ratio. One of the fundamental
objectives of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is to stimulate bank loan
growth. I use panel data to study the dynamic effect of TARP investments on banks’
loan to asset ratio (LTA). I find that TARP stimulate recipients’ LTA growth as a
whole, and the effect is significant only for medium banks(asset between 1 billion and
10 billion), with an annual decrease of 14 percentage points in LTA with the LTA
in treatment quarter as benchmark. In terms of a dollar amount, 7.71 dollar more
loans are generated for every TARP dollar invested in medium banks, compared with
the average level of the quarters before TARP. There is no significant effect on small
banks or big banks. Using graphs and different regression models, I argue that the
dynamic setting, rather than the cross-sectional comparison, is more appropriate.
vTo my parents and Jerry
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1CHAPTER I
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: RECONCILING ADVERSE EVENTS AND
STRATEGIC TIMING THEORIES USING HETEROGENEITY IN FILING
TYPES
1.1. Introduction
The study of consumer bankruptcy has highlighted several reasons why a consumer
files for bankruptcy1. Two theories, adverse events theory and strategic timing theory,
have received particular attention.
The adverse events theory postulates that consumers file for bankruptcy mainly
because they experience adverse events, and financial stresses associated with such
events. Adverse events occur, for example, in the form of a job loss, medical problems,
and particular family issues such as divorce. Financial stresses associated with such
events arise, for example, in the form of income interruption, income reduction, or
debt increase.
The strategic timing theory postulates that a rational consumer incorporates in
her decision-making, the bankruptcy option available under law, and its associated
costs and benefits, and making the best use of her economic environment, chooses
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
1The literature on consumer bankruptcy is very large. A partial list includes
the following. Stanley and Girth (1971) presents early work in this area. Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 1994, and 2000) present a version of the adverse events
theory. White (1988, 1998), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), Gross and Souleles (2002),
Fay, Hurst, and White (2002), Fan and White (2003), Han and Li (2011), Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007, 2010) explore versions of adverse events and strategic
timing theories and their impact on micro and macro decisions. Ausubel (1991,
1997) explores aspects of competition in the credit card industry. Theoretical models
for default and bankruptcy with competitive and incomplete markets are considered
in Zame (1993), Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1998), Araujo and Pascoa (2002),
Sabarwal (2003), Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005), Geanakoplos and Zame
(2007), and Hoelle (2009), among others.
2an optimal time to file for bankruptcy. In particular, if the best choice includes a
strategic, and lawful, use of debt and the bankruptcy system, then that is reflected
in consumer choice.
At the heart of each theory is the role of financial benefit in the bankruptcy filing
decision.
In the “strict”interpretation, strategic timing theory holds, if, ceteris paribus,
filing benefit affects the bankruptcy decision positively, and adverse events theory
holds, if, ceteris paribus, adverse events variables affect a consumer’s decision to
file. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Fay, Hurst,
and White (2002) (henceforth, FHW), show that financial benefit is positively and
significantly related to the filing decision, and after controlling for financial benefit,
adverse events variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision (except for a marginally
significant positive effect of divorce). Using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
data, we document a similar effect of financial benefit, but a strongly significant and
positive effect of divorce. Thus, using the strict interpretation, the PSID dataset
provides some support for the strategic hypothesis while the SCF dataset provides
some support for both the strategic and the adverse events hypothesis.
The strict interpretation implicitly assumes that strategic behavior is the only
behavior affecting financial benefit.
More realistically, financial benefit from filing goes up when a consumer strate-
gically increases unsecured debt before filing, consistent with strategic behavior; and
it also goes up when she uses unsecured debt (e.g. a credit card) to pay for expenses
due to adverse events, consistent with adverse events behavior. Therefore, financial
benefit is affected by both types of behavior, and a positive coefficient on financial
benefit alone may not be sufficient to distinguish between the two theories. This
point may be made more generally; we show that in the standard random utility
3model underlying the binary choice of filing and not filing, the coefficient on unse-
cured debt (and hence, on financial benefit from filing) is positive, regardless of how
debt is accumulated.
In this paper, we propose that even when financial benefit may affect the filing
decision in either theory, the inclusion of financial benefit as an optimizing variable
is a testable difference between the two theories. In other words, strategic consumers
may additionally manipulate debt before filing, but adverse events consumers do not.
We formalize this distinction by inquiring whether financial benefit is exogenous or
endogenous to the filing decision2. The discussions provide a set of natural instru-
mental variables, the adverse events. Using both PSID data and SCF data, we show
that financial benefit is exogenous to the bankruptcy decision, consistent with adverse
events theory. With both datasets, the coefficient on financial benefit from filing is
strongly significantly positive. To inquire into the possibility of both types of behav-
ior existing simultaneously, we extend the analysis by estimating a regime-switching
model with two types. We find evidence of heterogeneity in types consistent with both
behavior. In particular, financial benefit is shown to be endogenous for the strategic
type, and exogenous for the adverse events type. The coefficient on financial benefit
is significantly positive for the strategic type and insignificant for the adverse event
type.
To inquire into the possibility of both types of behavior existing simultaneously,
we extend the analysis by estimating a model with two unobserved types. We find
evidence of heterogeneity in types consistent with both behavior. In particular, finan-
cial benefit is shown to be endogenous for the strategic type, and exogenous for the
adverse events type. The coefficient on financial benefit is significantly positive for
2FHW do not explore potential endogeneity of financial benefit.
4the strategic type and positive but insignificant for the adverse events type. These
results show a role for both hypotheses.
Moreover, most of the variables for adverse events have the same effect on fi-
nancial benefit for both types, but with a larger absolute effect for strategic types.
Not working lowers financial benefit, increasing unemployment spell increases finan-
cial benefit, and divorce increases financial benefit. Health problems present a mixed
picture, a positive (and marginally significant) effect on financial benefit for adverse
types, but decreasing (and insignificant) effect for strategic types. These results doc-
ument a financial-benefits channel for adverse events.
As the types are unobserved, a mixture-density type of model is used. The ex-
clusion restriction includes access to debt markets (in terms of the number of credit
cards), income, a measure of risk aversion, and a measure of financial savviness.
Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie (2010) provide conditions for the non-parametric iden-
tification of mixture-density models. Both Henry, Kitamura and Salanie (2010) and
Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) suggest a Hausman-type specification test. We find
supporting evidence of the current two-type model when applying the test.
We find that lower access to debt markets and lower income significantly increase
the chance of strategic behavior. There is little evidence, however, of the effect of
risk aversion and financial savviness. On average, about 16 percent of the sample
is strategic type, and 84 percent is adverse events type, providing support for the
exogeneity of financial benefit in the one-type model.
For comparisons between the two types, the population is divided into two
groups. A household is of strategic type, if its type probability is greater than 0.5, and
is of adverse events type otherwise. We find that as compared to adverse events types,
strategic types have higher probability of filing and higher (log) financial benefit from
filing, consistent with the theoretical framework.
5The estimated model is used to predict effects of hypothesized changes in key
variables. In particular, we document the effects on filing probabilities resulting from
the effect of adverse events on financial benefits; exhibiting a financial-benefits channel
for adverse events effects. As bankruptcy is a form of insurance, the ideas here may
be related to moral hazard in insurance markets, as follows. Moral hazard relates to
increasing the benefit from insurance by taking some (additional) actions that increase
insurance payoffs. In our version, strategic timing behavior is similar to moral hazard,
in the sense that these consumers may additionally increase unsecured debt before
filing to increase their financial benefit from filing. Adverse events consumers do not
exhibit such moral hazard. Thus, another way to formulate a distinction between the
two hypotheses is to inquire whether, and to what extent, moral hazard is present in
the bankruptcy decision.
The question of adverse selection is not as relevant here; in principle, everyone
under the U.S. legal jurisdiction has access to bankruptcy, without having to pay
something to be selected into having a bankruptcy option.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2. presents the theoretical models and
testable predictions, and section 1.3. presents the econometric specifications, data,
and results.
1.2. Theoretical Models and Predictions
First, we show a positive relationship between unsecured debt and probability of filing
for bankruptcy, regardless of how debt is accumulated. Next, we formulate simple
models of adverse events and strategic timing hypotheses, and highlight their different
predictions.
61.2.1. A Positive Correlation between Financial Benefit and Filing Probability
FHW indicate that a positive and significant relationship between household finan-
cial benefit and probability of filing for bankruptcy signals strategic behavior by a
consumer. Similarly, Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) suggest that an increase in
probability of default with loan size is consistent with either moral hazard behavior
or adverse selection behavior. In the same spirit, we present a simple model showing
that financial benefit may affect the probability of filing, regardless of how debt is
accumulated.
In most empirical work, filing for bankruptcy is modeled as a binary choice model.
According to McFadden’s Random Utility Maximization model, a person would file
for bankruptcy if his utility difference between filing and not filing is positive. To
investigate this difference, let d be unsecured debt and w be assets minus secured
debt. For simplicity, the exemptions are normalized to be zero. Financial benefit
from filing, given d, is fb(file, d) = max(d − w, 0), and financial benefit from not
filing, given d, is fb(Not, d) = max(w − d, 0). Notice that fb(file, d) ≥ fb(Not, d) if
and only if d ≥ w.
Let u denote utility from monetary outcomes. Assume that u is strictly in-
creasing and continuously differentiable. We may write utility from filing, given
d as: U(file, d) = u(fb(file, d)); utility from not filing, given d as U(Not, d) =
u(fb(Not, d)); and the difference in these utilities is ∆U(d) = U(file, d)−U(Not, d).
Therefore,
∆U ′(d) = u′(fb(file, d))fb′(file, d)− u′(fb(Not, d)fb′(Not, d))
Consider the following cases.
d > w: In this case, fb′(file, d) = 1 and fb′(Not, d) = 0. Therefore, ∆U ′(d) =
7u′(fb(Not, d)) > 0.
d < w: In this case, fb′(file, d) = 0 and fb′(Not, d) = −1. Whence, ∆U ′(d) =
u′(fb(Not, d)) > 0.
d = w: In this case, limd→wu′(fb(file, d)) = u′(fb(file, w)) = u′(0) > 0 and
similarly, limd→wu′(fb(Not, d)) = u′(fb(Not, w)) = u′(0) > 0.
In all cases, we have ∆U ′(d) > 0.
In terms of empirical prediction, this implies that the coefficient on unsecured
debt (and consequently, on financial benefit from filing) is positive, regardless of how
debt is accumulated3. Therefore, given unsecured debt d, a positive relationship
between financial benefit from filing and filing for bankruptcy is expected.
1.2.2. Adverse Events Hypothesis
Frequent support for adverse events hypothesis has been advanced by Sullivan, War-
ren, and Westbrook (1989, 1994, 2000), among others. Using data from bankruptcy
filings in 1981 (for Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas), and in 1991 (for Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, California, and Tennessee), these authors paint a rich portrait of
consumers in bankruptcy, they present statistics that indicate similarities between
bankrupt debtors and the general population, especially middle-class families, and
they present a variety of cases and statistics to conclude that while some cases of
abuse of bankruptcy law may exist, bankruptcy is predominantly due to adverse
events. As they put it succinctly4, “No one plans to go bankrupt”.
In terms of formulating a model for this hypothesis, it is useful to keep in mind
that a pattern that emerges consistently in this hypothesis is that there are some
3Notice that all we used here was that u is strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable. No additional restriction is imposed on utility.
4Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000), page 73.
8events for which consumers do not plan (even if they may, in principle, be aware of
the existence of such events), and if such an event occurs, then they may be compelled
to file for bankruptcy. If such an event does not occur, consumers do not consider
filing for bankruptcy. For a statement like this to be true in a model of this hypothesis,
it is important to answer at least two questions. First, why don’t consumers plan
for some events? Second, even if they don’t plan for some events, why do they not
include a bankruptcy option in the events for which they do plan?
Consumers might not plan for some events if they assign an event a subjective
probability of zero. For example, we observe that in surveys of individual mortality,
some consumers list as zero their probability of next-period mortality (Gan, Hurd,
and McFadden, 2005). Such an assignment can arise if the cost of making very fine
probability distinctions is relatively high, or it can arise as a mistake that has a
miniscule impact. For example, in the PSID data, the probability of bankruptcy is
0.003017, as reported in FHW.
It is somewhat harder to justify theoretically why, in events for which consumers
otherwise plan, they do not include a bankruptcy option that is legally, and in prin-
ciple, widely available. One explanation for this is that ex ante, the benefit from a
bankruptcy filing is low relative to costs; for example, as reported in FHW, for fami-
lies that can gain from a bankruptcy filing, the mean benefit from filing is $7,813, and
the probability of filing is 0.003017, for an ex-ante filing benefit of about $25. This
is less than the cost of a planning session with a bankruptcy lawyer, or the resources
expended to purchase and plan with a book on how-to-file. Another explanation can
be provided in terms of utility penalties arising from future reputation losses from
filing; for example, see Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). Such losses can arise
from a combination of restricted future access to debt markets, credit score impact
(for severity of credit score impact, see Musto 2004,) and loss of option to re-file
9for some period (six years for a Chapter 7 filing). If such losses are very high when
consumers file in the absence of adverse events, and such losses outweigh benefits of
filing, then in non-adverse events, consumers may optimally decide not to consider a
bankruptcy option. For example, a bankruptcy flag on a consumer credit report is
one of the worst derogatories on a credit report, and it stays there for ten years, but
the legal system allows a Chapter 7 re-filing after six years. Consequently, the longer
memory of financial institutions of a consumer bankruptcy filing increases the cost of
filing by increasing future costs of accessing debt markets.
Therefore, as a first approximation, we may view adverse events consumers as
taking decisions sequentially; in period 1, they plan for some events, and in such
events, they do not plan to file for bankruptcy, but they do not plan for other events
(termed adverse events). In period 2, if a planned-for event occurs, they consume as
planned, and if an adverse event occurs, they include a bankruptcy option in their
decision-making and re-optimize accordingly. In other words, in period 1, “adverse
events consumers do not plan to go bankrupt”.
Consider a standard, two-period decision-making framework. In the first period,
there is one decision node. In the second period, one of three states of the world
prevails; a good state, indexed g, a bad state, b, and a terrible state, t, thought
of as an adverse events state. Each state corresponds to a decision node, and the
probability of each state is pig, pib and pit, respectively, with pig + pib + pit = 1.
As usual, a consumer has to decide how much to consume at each node; his
consumption is indexed c0, cg, cb and ct. Moreover, lending markets are available
to him at a one-period, risk-adjusted, market interest rate r. As usual, a single
consumer takes interest rates as given. His endowment in consumption units at each
node is denoted w0, wg, wb and wt. (For convenience, suppose w0 = 0, 0 < wt <
wb < wg.) Moreover, he has to decide how much debt to take, subject to some
10
exogenously specified debt limit; indexed d¯ > 0. His twice continuously differentiable
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is denoted u(c) with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =
∞, limc→∞ u′(c) =∞. His expected utility is U = u(c0)+δ[pigu(cg)+pibu(cb)+pitu(ct)].
An adverse events consumer takes decisions sequentially. In period 1, he plans
for states g, b, and he plans to remain solvent in these states, but he does not plan for
state t, the adverse events state. In period 2, if g or b occurs, he consumes as planned,
but if t occurs, he considers the option to file for bankruptcy. There are some costs of
filing for bankruptcy; usually some loss of assets, court fees, lawyer fees, limited future
participation in debt markets, and so on. Benefits of filing include, among others,
discharge of debt, fresh start, and accompanying wealth insurance. Adapting a simple
form of a Chapter 7 filing5, it is assumed that a filer gives up all his assets except any
exemptions from forfeiture provided by law, and his debt is discharged6. Exemptions
specified under law are summarized by e. Consequently, an adverse events consumer
solves the following problem.
Stage I : max
d,c0,cg ,cb,F ile,Not
u(c0) + δ[pigu(cg) + pibu(cb) + pitu(ct)
5Historically, Chapter 7 bankruptcies account for about 70 percent of all
bankruptcies.
6The other main personal bankruptcy category, Chapter 13 bankruptcy, account-
ing for about 29 percent of all cases, can be viewed in this formulation as follows.
In this type of filing, a repayment plan proposed by the debtor is confirmed by the
Court, and a discharge of remaining debt is provided on successful completion of the
plan. In this case, net assets saved and debts discharged depend on the repayment
plan, and can be mapped to this model after an appropriate discounting for period
of plan. Exemptions provided under law are the same in both cases.
11
subject to c0 = d
cg = wg − (1 + r)d
cb = wb − (1 + r)d
d ≤ d¯
Stage II : If t , then set :
ct = max(wt − (1 + r)d,min(wt, e))]
In Stage I, a consumer decides optimal debt and consumption (d, c0, cg, cb), and by
assumption, he does not file in g, b. Given d > 0, and wt < e, in Stage II, if t occurs,
optimal choice is to file and consume ct = wt.
1.2.3. Strategic Timing Hypothesis
A strategic timing consumer is a standard fully rational consumer who includes the
bankruptcy option in her maximization problem. Assumptions regarding decision
nodes, endowments, utility functions, and expected utility are the same as in the
previous case. Moreover, it is assumed that the bankruptcy process is the same as
in the previous case. Of course, the difference is in the optimization problem. In
each state in the second period, a strategic timing consumer has an option to file for
bankruptcy, and solves the following problem.
max
d,c0,cg ,cb,F ile,Not
u(c0) + δ[pigu(cg) + pibu(cb) + pitu(ct)]
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subject to c0 = d
cg = max(wg − (1 + r)d,min(wg, e))
cb = max(wb − (1 + r)d,min(wb, e))
ct = max(wt − (1 + r)d,min(wt, e))
d ≤ d¯
The maximum operator for decision nodes in the second period corresponds to the
bankruptcy decision. For example, if a consumer decides not to file in g, her constraint
is wg−(1+r)d, and if she decides to file, her constraint is min(w, e), where, as before,
e captures exemptions permitted in bankruptcy.
1.2.4. Comparisons between the Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions
One distinction between strategic timing and adverse events hypothesis is that for
strategic timing consumers, the bankruptcy decision and the debt decision (and con-
sequently, financial benefit) are jointly determined, whereas for adverse events con-
sumers, the debt decision (and consequently, financial benefit) is exogenous to the
filing decision. This follows immediately from the construction of the two models.
For the clearest distinctions between the two hypotheses in terms of financial
benefits and probabilities of filing, suppose 0 < wt < wb ≤ e < wg. That is, exemp-
tions are sufficiently high to have non-negative financial benefit from filing in bad and
terrible states, but not necessarily in a good state.
In this case, strategic timing consumers file for bankruptcy in states t and b, and
perhaps in g as well, whereas adverse events consumers file only in state t. Therefore,
a second distinction is that adverse events consumers may file less frequently (or
equivalently, with lower probability) than strategic timing consumers.
Another intuitive comparative statics result that can be seen here formally is
13
that debt use by adverse events consumers is sometimes less, and never more than
that for strategic timing consumers. Of course, when debt limits are sufficiently low,
both types might decide to use maximum possible debt, and in this case, debt levels
are the same. But notice that the optimal debt level for adverse events consumers
can be lower than that for strategic timing consumers, because for every d,
MUAE(d) = u′(d)− δ(1 + r)pigu′(wg − (1 + r)d)− δ(1 + r)pibu′(wb − (1 + r)d)
< u′(d)− δ(1 + r)pigu′(wg − (1 + r)d) [=MUST (Not, d)]
< u′(d) [=MUST (File, d)]
Here, MUST (Not, d) is the marginal utility to the strategic consumer from not filing
in state g when debt is d, and MUST (File, d) is the marginal utility to the strategic
consumer from filing in state g when debt is d. Therefore, if not filing in g is optimal for
the strategic consumer, then MUAE(d∗ST ) < MUST (Not, d∗ST ) = 0 = MUAE(d∗AE)
, whence d∗AE < d∗ST . (Here, d∗AE is the optimal debt level for the adverse events
consumer, d∗ST for the strategic consumer, and we used the easy-to-check fact that
∂MUAE(d)/∂d < 0.) Similarly, if filing in g is optimal for the strategic consumer,
thenMUAE(d∗ST ) < MUST (file, d∗ST ) = 0 =MUAE(d∗AE), and again, d∗AE < d∗ST .
Consequently, unsecured debt (and therefore, financial benefit from filing) is larger
for strategic consumers than for adverse events consumers.
In summary, the empirical predictions from the theoretical analysis include: (a)
financial benefit is endogenous to the bankruptcy decision in the strategic timing
hypothesis and exogenous in the adverse events hypothesis; and (b) financial benefit
and probability of filing for bankruptcy are higher in strategic timing hypothesis than
in adverse events hypothesis.
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1.2.5. Some Limitations
The models presented above are simple models, and by no means capture all relevant
aspects of the bankruptcy decision. Issues related to choosing a particular period
to file for bankruptcy, or to repeat interactions with credit markets, or to choice of
bankruptcy chapter, or to role of legal advertising, or to effects on supply of credit,
or to effects on work incentives, and so on are not considered here. (Some of these
are the subject of other papers, listed above.) It is possible to consider some of these
issues here in a reduced form by including parameters for expected gains and losses
from delaying a decision, or reduced access to credit markets, or utility penalties for
default, and then focusing on parameter values which make particular versions of the
models more likely to occur, but it is unclear if such additions would yield tractable
models, or have additional applications given the paucity of available data.
The results here can be viewed as providing an indication of alternative hypothe-
ses being borne out in the data, rather than a definitive conclusion in favor of one
hypothesis or the other. For example, in addition to research supporting different
hypotheses, the reported surge in bankruptcy filings before the deadline of October
17, 2005 for the new bankruptcy law to go into effect suggests that other factors
(perhaps informational spillovers emerging from declining social stigma, or lawyer
advertising) are important as well. No doubt, additional work may yield additional
testable predictions, and additional research would be very welcome.
1.3. Econometric Models and Results
In this section, we first provide some information on the data and construction of
variables. Next, we present three specifications and estimation results for each speci-
fication. The specifications considered are: a simple Probit model, a one-type model
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(with joint maximum likelihood estimation), and a two-type model (with joint max-
imum likelihood estimation).
1.3.1. Data Description and Variables
We use two different datasets to check robustness of our results. One is the combined
cross-section and time series sample of PSID households over the period 1984-1995;
the same dataset is used in FHW. The other is the cross sectional dataset of SCF
from 1998.
In 1996, the PSID asked respondents whether they had ever filed for bankruptcy
and if so, in which year. This information, combined with other household charac-
teristics forms the basis of our first dataset. The PSID data are generally of high
quality, but they have some limitations for a study of this kind. In particular, wealth
is only measured at 5-year intervals, and it contains less detail on some aspects of
use in this study. Moreover, as documented in FHW, there are only 254 bankruptcy
filings over the period 1984-1995, and bankruptcy filings in the PSID are only about
one-half of the national filing rate. There were 55 bankruptcy filings in 1997, or about
1.28 percent of households, comparable to the 1997 national bankruptcy filing rate of
1.16 percent. The SCF is cross-sectional only, so we lose the time-series aspect in this
case, but there is some information for the year prior to the survey, and on future
expectations.
SCF also provides us with better wealth data, which reports 1997 wealth in-
formation and 1997 bankruptcy filings. (The survey itself was conducted between
June and December of 1998 7. ) In Table I, we compare financial benefits (discussed
below) and unsecured debt between filers and non-filers for both PSID and SCF.
7See Kennickell et. at (2000).
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Table I. Summary Statistics
Variables PSID data SCF data
Mean value Standard deviation Mean value Standard deviation
Number of bankruptcy filings 254 55
Financial benefit $1,411 $10,523 $3,991 $26,001
Log(financial benefit +1) 1.64 3.24 1.95 3.69
Those file for bankruptcy 3.65 4.26 6.78 4.38
Log(unsecured debt+1) 3.85 3.94 4.35 4.45
Those file for bankruptcy 5.74 3.96 5.88 3.96
Household labor income $26,552 $32,672 $43,035 $37,967
Age of household head 44.19 15.96 49.84 16.52
Years of education of household head 12.43 5.1 13.74 2.9
Family size 2.9 1.55 2.65 1.44
Own home 0.59 0.49 0.7 0.46
Self employed/own business 0.11 0.31 0.25 0.44
Head is divorced 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.33
Head is unemployed 0.06 0.23 0.23 0.42
Weeks of unemployment of head 6.76 2.01 2.39 6.34
Head has health problem 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19
ln(income) 10.89 1.98
Number of credit cards 4.44 4.36
Risk averse 0.3 0.46
Shop around 2.95 1.41
Total number of observations 64,200 4,305
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Similar patterns emerge. In PSID, the mean log(financial benefit) for filers is more
than twice as much than those non-filers. In SCF, filers have more than three times
as much mean log(financial benefits) than non-filers. In both SCF and PSID, the
mean log(unsecured debt) for filers is greater than that of non-filers.
Financial benefit from filing is the key variable in this paper. It is calculated as
follows:
fb = max[debt−max(wealth− exemption, 0), 0]
In this formula, max(wealth − exemption, 0) calculates the nonexempt assets
that a filer loses in bankruptcy. It measures financial cost of filing for bankruptcy8.
The variable debt measures the unsecured debt that will be discharged in bankruptcy;
a measure of benefit of filing. As not filing dominates filing when debt−max(wealth−
exemption, 0) is negative, the financial benefit from filing is truncated at 0 to yield
the above formula.
To calculate financial benefit in the PSID, we use the same dataset as FHW.
For the SCF, we make the following adjustments. The SCF provides only region
codes; state codes are not released in public data. To get a relative weight for each
state in a region, we use Regional Economic Information System (REIS) from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. These state weights are based on the population of a
state relative to the region in which it is included. These weights are used to compute
the composite exemption level of a region.
Using Elias, Renauer, and Leonard (1999), we determine each state’s exemption
levels for 1998 for homestead equity in owner-occupied homes, equity in vehicles,
8A more complete measure of costs would include both out-of-pocket filing costs,
and future costs resulting from more restricted access to debt markets. Reliable data
on these measures is not available. Adding a constant, of course, would not change
the qualitative results.
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personal property, and wildcard exemptions. We adjust for state level variables to
the extent we can. For example, if a state doubles exemptions for married households,
we do the same. For the fifteen states allowing residents to choose between state or
federal exemptions, we take the larger of the exemptions. For households in states
with an unlimited homestead exemption, we take the homestead exemption to be the
average of home values in the entire sample.
The variable exemption is assumed to be the sum of these exemptions, because
we do not observe a household’s state of residence. The variable wealth is the sum
of net worth of businesses a household owns, current values of the vehicles it owns,
and value of real estate it owns.
To make the two datasets consistent with each other, we include a vector of
demographic variables which may be related to households’ filing decisions, such as
age of household head, years of education of the head, family size, whether head owns
their home. Moreover, as adverse events variables, we include spell of unemployment,
its squared term, whether the head is unemployed, whether the head’s marital status
is divorce, whether the head’s health condition is poor. For the PSID dataset, these
variables are calculated using the values of corresponding variables in the year prior
to their bankruptcy. For the SCF data, we also included whether the head has health
insurance, and we include only the region dummies rather than macro information
to capture the local fixed effects due to the lack of information regarding state of
residency.
1.3.2. Simple Probit Model
Let’s first consider a simple Probit regression, similar to FHW’s specification.
file = 1(γfb+Xβ + αAE + u > 0)
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This specification explores the strategic timing and adverse event hypotheses by
running the Probit regression of whether households file for bankruptcy (file) as
a function of their potential financial benefit, fb, from filing, their personal and state
characteristics X, and the adverse events they encountered in the previous year, AE.
As described above, the strict interpretation focuses on the significance of the
coefficients on financial benefit and on adverse events. If strategic timing theory is
true, the coefficients of financial benefit should be positive and significant while the
adverse event variables should not be significant. If adverse event theory is true,
then adverse event variables should be positive and significant while the coefficient of
financial benefit should be insignificant.
Table II and Table III illustrate this simple specification with PSID data and
SCF data9. (For ease of comparison, we keep the other variables same as those in
FHW.) As shown in Table II, using PSID data, the coefficients on the variables are
comparable to those reported in FHW. In particular, financial benefit affects the filing
decision positively and highly significantly, and its squared term is highly significant.
Among statistically significant adverse events, divorce is positive but only marginally
significant. Moreover, using SCF data, financial benefit continues to be positive and
highly significant, but its squared term is not significant any more. The coefficient
on divorce remains positive, but is highly significant.
Thus, using the strict interpretation, and the simple Probit model, the PSID
dataset provides support for the strategic hypothesis while the SCF dataset provides
support for both the strategic and the adverse events hypothesis.
9For all estimates, * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** at 95 percent, and ***
at 99 percent.
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Table II. Simple Probit Model
Variables PSID data SCF data
without adverse with adverse without adverse with adverse
event variables event variables event variables event variables
financial benefit
0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00002*** 0.00002***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (6.60E-06) (6.85E-06)
financial benefit squared
-1.04e-9*** -1.03e-9*** -1.09E-10 -1.08E-10
(4.04E-10) (3.99E-10) (6.98E-11) (7.36E-11)
lagged bankruptcy rate
5.95905** 5.62294**
(2.67377) (2.68448)
household labor income
-4.98e-6*** -3.46e-6**
(1.41E-06) (1.80E-06)
reduction in income
-2.17e-6*** -3.06e-6***
(5.92E-07) (1.02E-06)
age of household head
0.02917** 0.01846 0.0285 -0.00296
(0.0137) (0.01306) (0.0327) (0.0319)
age squared
-0.00048*** -0.00036** -0.00035 -0.00003
(0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00036 ) (0.0003)
education
-0.02981*** -0.03879*** 0.0088 -0.0101
(0.01155) (0.01097) (0.0218) (0.0218)
family size
0.03736** 0.03228* 0.0687** 0.0951***
(0.01673) (0.01669) (0.0332) (0.0363)
own business
0.04037 0.09489 -0.1608 -0.1661
(0.0918) (0.09147) (0.263) (0.24)
own home
-0.1371* -0.19982*** -0.1084 -0.1663
(0.07437) (0.06757) (0.1553) (0.1484)
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Table III. Simple Probit Model, Part II
Variables PSID data SCF data
without adverse with adverse without adverse with adverse
event variables event variables event variables event variables
lawyers per capita
-0.7776 -0.98042
(0.74456 ) (0.73636)
county unemployment rate
0.09337 0.10714
(0.10457) (0.11386)
state income growth
-2.39603** -2.23304*
(1.19746 ) (1.18386)
state income deviation
-0.12465 -0.12976
(0.08725) (0.08821)
divorce
0.23206* 0.6434***
(0.13196) (0.1578)
period of unemployment
0.0134 -0.0066
(0.02435 ) (0.011)
health problem
0.09265 -0.1097
(0.11733) (0.3149)
state fixed effects yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes no no
constant
-2.3797*** -2.23563*** -3.0914*** -2.6235***
(0.71384) (0.75997) (0.8504) (0.8231)
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1.3.3. One-type Model
Given the limitation of the strict interpretation, we propose to test the endogeneity of
financial benefit by jointly estimating financial benefit and the bankruptcy decision.
The basic empirical model here is:
file∗ = Xβ + γln(fb+ 1) + u { file = 1 if file
∗ > 0
file = 0 if file∗ ≤ 0
(1.1)
ln(fb∗ + 1) = Xδ + µAE + v { fb = fb
∗ if fb∗ ≥ 0
fb = 0 if fb∗ < 0
(1.2)
Notice that endogeneity of ln(fb+ 1) is equivalent to whether the error terms u
and v are correlated. The key difference between this model and FHW’s specification
is the role of the set of adverse events, AE. Here, AE no longer directly affects a
person’s bankruptcy decision. Instead, it serves as the set of instrumental variables
that directly affects the financial benefits, fb, in (1.2). Another minor difference
between these two models is that the logarithm of financial benefit is used here while
FHW use the level of financial benefits. As fb depends on the wealth level, it is
most likely to exhibit a log-normal distribution, although censored at zero. With a
logarithm transformation, we will assume that v is normally distributed.
Let V ar(u) = 1, V ar(v) = σ2v , and assume the relationship between u and v as
follows:
u = θv + ε
where Cov(v, ε) = 0, and V ar(ε) = 1 − θ2σ2v . In this version, testing if ln(fb + 1)
is endogenous is equivalent to testing if the parameter θ = 0. The probability a
household files when financial benefit is zero is given by
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Pr(file = 1, ln(fb+ 1) = 0) =
∫ −Xδ−µAE
−∞
Φ(
Xβ + θv√
1− θ2σ2v
)
1
σv
φ
v
σv
dv (1.3)
and therefore, the probability it does not file when financial benefit is zero is
given by
Pr(file = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0) =
∫ −Xδ−µAE
−∞
Φ(− Xβ + θv√
1− θ2σ2v
)
1
σv
φ
v
σv
dv
Similarly,
Pr(file = 1, ln(fb+ 1)) = Φ(
Xβ + γln(fb+ 1) + θ(ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ − µAE)√
1− θ2σ2v
)
∗ 1
σv
φ(
ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ − µAE
σv
)
and
Pr(file = 0, ln(fb+ 1)) = [1− Φ(Xβ + γln(fb+ 1) + θ(ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ − µAE)√
1− θ2σ2v
)]
∗ 1
σv
φ(
ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ − µAE
σv
)
The log-likelihood function over the sample is given by
L =
∑
file=0,ln(fb+1)>0
ln(Pr(bank = 0, ln(fb+ 1) > 0))
+
∑
file=1,ln(fb+1)>0
ln(Pr(bank = 1, ln(fb+ 1) > 0))
+
∑
file=0,ln(fb+1)=0
ln(Pr(bank = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0))
+
∑
file=1,ln(fb+1)=0
ln(Pr(bank = 1, ln(fb+ 1) = 0))
Estimation results are presented in Tables IV and V10. We find that using either
10We apply a log transformation to financial benefit, because this variable exhibits
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Table IV. One Type Model(MLE;PSID data)
Variables coefficient standard error
Correlation between the two error terms θ -0.1423 0.3562
Bankruptcy equation
Log financial benefit 0.0791*** 0.0321
Age 0.0146 0.0124
Age squared -0.000264** 0.000138
Lagged bankruptcy filing rate 5.805*** 2.791
Education -0.0204*** 0.0098
Family size 0.0223 0.016
Own business 0.0531 0.0837
Own home -0.05835 0.0565
Lawyer per capita -0.0389 0.7598
Growth rate of income -1.915 1.344
State income deviation -0.1424* 0.0774
State and time dummies yes
constant -2.1573*** 0.5716
Financial benefit equation
Excluded adverse event variables
Health 1.924*** 0.2295
Divorce 0.3603 0.3356
No work -1.358*** 0.2552
Period of unemployment 0.7635*** 0.1968
Period of unemployment squared -0.0475*** 0.0123
Other control variables
Age -0.1338*** 0.0261
Age squared -0.00067*** 0.00027
Lagged bankruptcy filing rate -3.523 8.545
Education -0.0305*** 0.0147
Family size 0.4157*** 0.0398
Own business -3.204*** 0.2238
Own home -3.215*** 0.1332
Lawyer per capita -2.942* 1.618
Growth rate of income -2.302*** 3.439
State income deviation -0.2989*** 0.1997
State and time dummies yes
Constant -0.8642** 1.6281
Standard deviation of error term 3.2073*** 0.0127
Log-likelihood -61773
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PSID data (Table IV), or SCF data (Table V), the estimated parameter θ is not
statistically different from zero, consistent with the adverse events hypothesis. At
the same time, log financial benefit has a positive and highly significant effect on the
decision to file for bankruptcy in both datasets.
Both datasets confirm the view that adverse events may affect financial benefit.
In the PSID data (Table IV), health shocks and period of unemployment increase
financial benefit highly significantly, whereas a switch from working to not working
(no work dummy) decreases financial benefit. In the SCF data (Table V), divorce
increases financial benefit highly significantly, whereas no work decreases financial
benefit. In both datasets, period of unemployment increases financial benefit (highly
significantly in the PSID data, but insignificantly in the SCF data), and its square
term is negative.
1.3.4. Two-type Model(MLE)
To inquire into the possibility of both types of behavior existing simultaneously, we
extend the analysis to allow for heterogeneity in types by proposing a two-type model.
Let a random variable T = 1 if a person is a strategic type, and T = 2 if a person
is a non-strategic (or adverse events) type. For simplicity, we let
Pr(T = 1) = Φ(Wα)
and
Pr(T = 2) = 1− Φ(Wα)
W is a set of type-determinant variables.The filing decision may be impacted
a distribution that is similar to log-normal but is left-censored at zero. In particular,
we use log(financialbenefit+ $1). This is to capture the characteristics of censored
data at zero. The transformed variable is also left-censored at zero.
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Table V. One Type Model(MLE;SCF data)
Variables coefficient standard error
Correlation between the two errors θ -0.2845 0.2032
Bank equation
Log financial benefit 0.1377*** 0.036
Age 0.0447* 0.024
Age squared -0.0004* 0.0002
Family size 0.0551 0.0394
Own home 0.019 0.1285
Own business -0.2 0.1981
Years of education 0.225 0.1643
Years of education squared -0.0092 0.0064
Region dummies Yes
constant -5.5722*** 1.2724
Financial benefit equation
Excluded adverse variables
Health 1.041 1.1136
No work -4.6296*** 0.8369
Period of unemployment 0.1472 0.1248
Period of unemployment squared -0.0027 0.0033
Divorce 2.6813*** 0.595
Other control variables
Age -0.0628 0.0845
Age squared -0.0014 0.0009
Family size 0.2121 0.1516
Own home -5.1205*** 0.49
Own business -7.5376*** 0.6801
Years of education 0.5068 0.3661
Years of education squared -0.0483*** 0.0152
Region dummies yes
Constant 7.8295** 3.1007
Standard deviation of error term 9.3535*** 0.1262
Log-likelihood -4812.66
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differently for each type, as follows.
When T = 1, the filing equation is
file = 1[Xβ1 + γ1ln(fb+ 1) + u1 > 0] (1.4)
When T = 2, the filing equation is
file = 1[Xβ2 + γ2ln(fb+ 1) + u2 > 0] (1.5)
We normalize the variances of the error terms for both types to be 1, i.e. V ar(u1) =
V ar(u2) = 1.
Similarly, we allow behavior in accumulating debt or financial benefit to be dif-
ferent for each type. For the strategic type, financial benefit is assumed to be endoge-
nous, and for the adverse events type, it is assumed to be exogenous. Thus, for the
strategic type,
ln(fb∗ + 1) = Xδ1 + µ1AE + v1 {
fb = fb∗ if fb∗ ≥ 0
fb = 0 if fb∗ < 0
and u1 = θ1v1 + ε1
where the variance for the error term ε1 is V ar(ε1) = 1 − θ2σ2v1 , if we assume that
V ar(v1) = σ
2
v1
.
For the adverse events type,
ln(fb∗ + 1) = Xδ2 + µ2AE + v2 {
fb = fb∗ if fb∗ ≥ 0
fb = 0 if fb∗ < 0
where Cov(u2, v2) = 0. In empirical estimation, we will allow the possibility that
Cov(u2, v2) 6= 0, and estimate their correlation.
Notice that the joint density of (bank, ln(fb+1)) consists of four parts, (bank =
0, ln(fb + 1) = 0), (bank = 1, ln(fb + 1) = 0), (bank = 0, ln(fb + 1)), and (bank =
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1, ln(fb+1)). In the last two cases ln(fb+1) is positive and continuous. The density
function for each of the four cases is given in Appendix A.
The model suggested here belongs to the class of the mixture density models.
A well-known necessary identification condition of the model requires the exclusion
restriction, i.e., the set W is different from X and AE. Henry, Kitamura, and Salani
(2010) show that a correlation between W and T and the independence between
W and the error terms (u1 and u2) in equations (1.4) and (1.5) are sufficient to
identify the model up to a linear transformation non-parametrically. When the set
W has more than one variable, Henry, Kitamura, and Salani (2010) and Gan, Huang,
and Mayer (2011) show that a using the full set of W and a subset of W would
both produce consistent estimates of parameters of the model except the coefficients
to determine the type. A Hausman-type specification test can be implemented by
comparing estimates using the full set of W with those using a subset of W 11. This
test is similar to an overidentification test in the instrumental variable models.
Here we suggest a set of variables that includes number of credit cards, logarithm
of income, whether the person is risk averse12, and whether the person shops around
for the best term13. These variables are not in the set of X that directly explains the
bankruptcy decision.
Our prior is that a person’s credit worthiness may be an important factor in
11Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) provide an economic interpretation of this type
of mixture density model.
12SCF asks its respondents: “Which of the statements on this page comes closest
to the amount of financial risk that you are willing to take when you save or make
investments?” and we define the variable “risk averse” to be one if the respondent
chooses “not willing to take any financial risks”.
13SCF asks its respondents: “When making major saving and investment decisions,
some people shop around for the very best terms while others don’t. What number
would you be on the scale?” And this variable is a number between 1 and 5, the
larger the number, the greater the shopping.
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determining her type. A better credit-scored person may be less likely to be the
strategic type. Since credit scores are not available in the data set, several variables
that are related to credit scores are used. Therefore, the person with fewer numbers
of cards is more likely to belong to the strategic type. Moreover, it is reasonable to
postulate that a person who shops around is more frugal, and hence less likely to
take on debt, and therefore, less focused on planning for bankruptcy. Thus, a person
who shops around more may be less likely to be a strategic type. The effect of risk
aversion on determining the type is unclear. It is not necessarily the case that a more
risk-averse person is more likely to file for bankruptcy14. The summary statistics of
these four variables can be found in Table I. All variables have substantial variations.
Table VI shows estimation results for this model, using SCF data15. This frame-
work provides the clearest distinctions between the two models, as described in section
1.2. above.
One important distinction between the two models is endogeneity or exogeneity
of financial benefit. Although we allow for the possibility of non-zero correlation
between the error terms in the bankruptcy model and the financial benefit model
for both types, only the strategic type exhibits a statistically significant (at the 90
percent level) correlation, at -0.5846 (0.3285), while the correlation for the adverse
events type is statistically insignificant, at 0.2581 (0.4163). Thus, financial benefit is
endogenous to the bankruptcy decision for strategic types, and exogenous for adverse
events types, as predicted by the hypothesis.
The coefficient on log of financial benefit is positive and highly significant for
14Gan and Mosquera (2008) (Appendix ) show that a more risk averse person may
or may not have a higher probability of default, depending on relative current income
and future income.
15The two-type model could only be estimated using SCF data, partly because
PSID does not have the type-determination variables similar to those in SCF.
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Table VI. Two Type Model(MLE;SCF data)
Variables coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Strategic type Adverse event type
Correlation b/w two errors θ -0.5846* 0.3285 0.2581 0.4163
Bankruptcy equation
Log(fb+1) 0.2770*** 0.057 0.011 0.0858
Age 0.0222 0.0369 0.1172* 0.0653
Age squared -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0015** 0.0007
Family size -0.1045 0.0876 0.1053* 0.0588
Own home 0.239 0.3136 -0.2482 0.3033
Own business 0.7114* 0.4029 -5.5096 7.44
Years of education 1.3436* 0.724 -0.0134 0.1644
Years of education sqaured -0.0443* 0.0266 -0.002 0.0071
Region effect Yes Yes
Constant -12.3733** 5.0088 -7.2476 13.5505
IV equation (dependent variable=log(financial benefit+1))
Health problem -0.7917 2.3225 2.4583* 1.3444
No work -6.4100*** 2.3011 -3.5781*** 0.9846
Period of unemployment 3.2717** 1.5428 0.3178** 0.1384
Period of unemployment squared -0.5806** 0.2441 -0.005 0.0036
Divorce 5.1524*** 1.3938 1.8007*** 0.6611
Age 0.1664 0.2156 -0.1673* 0.0973
Age squared -0.0023 0.0024 -0.001 0.001
Family size 1.1862*** 0.3552 0.048 0.1715
Own home 3.7440** 1.4665 -7.0255*** 0.5391
Own business -5.4919* 2.8768 -6.9133*** 0.6964
Years of education -0.6585 0.7818 0.6253 0.4773
Years of education squared 0.0206 0.0393 -0.0618*** 0.0188
Region effect Yes Yes
Constant -4.4446 7.9765 15.1605*** 3.8812
Standard deviation of error term 8.4186*** 0.2958 8.5855*** 0.1337
Type equation (strategic type = 1)
ln(income) -0.5552*** 0.1115
Number of credit cards -2.3736*** 0.4912
Risk averse 0.2923 0.2453
Shop around -0.0519 0.0804
Constant 5.9368*** 1.1521
Log-likelihood -4650.25
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the strategic type, at 0.2770 (0.0570), but for adverse events type, this coefficient is
positive and insignificant, at 0.0110 (0.0858). The coefficient for the strategic type is
larger than the coefficient for the adverse events type, as predicted by the hypothesis.
Similarly, variables for adverse events (other than health problems) have the
same effect on both types, but with a larger absolute effect for strategic types. Not
working lowers financial benefit, increasing unemployment spell increases financial
benefit, and divorce increases financial benefit. Health problems present a mixed
picture, a positive (and marginally significant) effect on financial benefit for adverse
types, but decreasing (and insignificant) effect for strategic types. These results
document a financial-benefits channel for adverse events.
The last panel in Table VI shows that fewer numbers of credit cards increases
the chance of strategic behavior, as does an increase in risk aversion. Consumers who
shop around more are less likely to be strategic type. A lower income also increases
the chance of strategic behavior.
As shown in Table VII, the average probability of being a strategic type is 0.1566.
This provides additional confirmation for the exogeneity of financial benefit in the
one-type model.
For additional analysis of the two types, we divide the population into two groups.
A household is of strategic type, if its type probability is greater than 0.5, and is
of adverse events type otherwise. According to this criterion, 802 households are
strategic type and 3,503 households are adverse events type, as shown in Table VII.
Notably, on average, a strategic type has a 3.37% chance to file for bankruptcy,
more than 4 times higher than the 0.8% chance of the adverse type. This greater
filing probability is consistent with the empirical prediction of the model in section
1.2.. Similarly, in terms of the predicted probabilities, a strategic type is expected to
have 9.84% chance to file for bankruptcy while the adverse events type would have
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Table VII. Comparing Strategic Type and Adverse Events Type
mean standard error min max
Probability of being strategic type 0.1566 0.3069 0 1
Strategic type if predicted prob (type = 1) > 0.5
Strategic type Adverse event type
Observed probability of filing for bankruptcy 0.0337 0.008
Predicted probability of filing for bankruptcy 0.0984 0.0061
Log(financial benefit) 2.4523 1.8287
% financial benefits > 0 30.80% 20.81%
Number of households 802 3503
0.61% chance to file for bankruptcy.
Moreover, the two types exhibit different levels of financial benefits. The average
level of log of financial benefit is 2.4523 for the strategic type, about 34 percent larger
than 1.8287 for the adverse events type. The larger financial benefit for strategic
type is again consistent with the prediction of the model. Similarly, on average,
about 30.8% of strategic type consumers have strictly positive financial benefit, as
compared to 20.81% of adverse events type.
As shown in Table VII, the predicted probability of filing for bankruptcy is higher
than actual for both types. One possible explanation is that financial benefit from
filing for bankruptcy is heavily censored at zero (about 80 percent of the financial
benefit calculations take the value of zero), and the predicted value is close to the
true data of the percentage of those zeroes. This may also provide a reason why the
bias of mean of log financial benefit is so large.
Table VIII shows the effects of hypothesized changes in particular variables on
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Table VIII. SCF Predictions(Two Type Model)
Hypothesized variable change
Mean effect on log Percentage point Percentage change
financial benefit(std) marginal effect(std) in the filing rate
Strategic Adverse Strategic Adverse Total Strategic Adverse Total
type type type type type type
Financial benefit +$1000 — — 0.0221 1.95E-05 0.0035 65.58 0.24 27.4
from mean $3990.772 ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0007 )
Financial benefit +$1000 — — 0.0047 1.00E-05 0.0007 13.95 0.13 5.48
from positive mean $ 17602.74 ( 0.0009 ) ( 8.00E-05 ) ( 0.0002 )
Age of household head +1 0.1646 -0.1651 0.0129 0.0097 0.0102 38.28 121.25 78.94
years from mean 49.84 ( 0.2148 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.0146 ) ( 0.0215 ) ( 0.0183 )
Family size +0.5 0.5928 0.0239 0.0135 1.30E-06 0.0021 40.06 0.02 16.44
from mean 2.65 ( 0.1794 ) ( 0.0857 ) ( 0.0102 ) ( 2.10E-06 ) ( 0.0016 )
Own home +5% 0.1869 -0.3514 0.007 -2.60E-08 0.0011 20.77 -3.30E-04 8.61
from mean 70% ( 0.0733 ) ( 0.0269 ) ( 0.0043 ) ( 5.40E-07 ) ( 0.0007 )
Education +1 year -0.6839 0.624 0.0515 0.0076 0.0145 152.82 95 113.5
from mean 13.74 ( 0.7922 ) ( 0.4777 ) ( 0.1221 ) ( 0.0234 ) ( 0.0277 )
We compute each household’s estimated probability of bankruptcy under the hypoth-
esized change, holding all other household characteristics at their mean. The marginal
effect is the change in the probability of bankruptcy for that household. The column
labeled “Total” gives the weighted average of the changes, using probability of strate-
gic type as 0.1566 and that of adverse events type as 0.8434. The last three columns
translate the marginal effects into the corresponding percentage change in the filing
rate, as follows: divide the marginal effect of the strategic type by the filing proba-
bility of strategic type, which is 0.0337 in the sample, that of adverse type by their
filing probability, which is 0.008, and the total by the total filing probability, which
is 0.01278. Figures in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors, computed using
5,000 repetitions of the sample.
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the probability of filing16. For example, if financial benefit goes up by $1,000, and
all other characteristics are held constant at sample means, the average strategic
type’s filing probability goes up 0.0221 percentage points (equivalently, the filing
probability increases by 0.0221), that of an adverse events type goes up negligibly,
and the total filing probability goes up about 0.0035 percentage points. In terms of
a percentage change in the filing rate, filing rates for strategic types go up by 65.58
percent, those for adverse types go up by 0.24 percent, and total filings go up by
27.4 percent17. Similarly, if home-ownership increases by 5 percentage points, the
filing rates of strategic types go up about 21 percent, those of adverse types go down
negligibly, and the overall filing rate goes up about 9 percent.
Our framework allows estimates of the effects of adverse events on filing prob-
abilities through the channel of financial benefit. Table IX presents some of these
effects. If the average spell of unemployment goes down by 1 week, the filing rate
of strategic types goes down 93 percent, that of adverse events goes down negligibly,
and the overall filing rate goes down 38 percent. A 5 percentage point decrease in the
proportion of people not working leads to an increase in filing rate of strategic types
by 27 percent, a negligible increase for adverse types, and an 11 percent increase in
the overall filing rate. Similarly, a decrease of 5 percentage points in divorce, lowers
the overall filing rate by about 8 percent. Notice that the comparatively smaller ef-
fects for adverse type (as compared to strategic type) are in part due to their much
16The columns for percentage point marginal effect show the change in filing prob-
ability. The column labeled “Total” gives the weighted average of the changes, using
probability of strategic type as 0.1566 and that of adverse events type as 0.8434.
17The last three columns in Table VIII translate the marginal effects into the cor-
responding percentage change in the filing rate, as follows: divide the marginal effect
of the strategic type by the filing probability of strategic type, which is 0.0337 in the
sample, that of adverse type by their filing probability, which is 0.008, and the total
by the total filing probability, which is 0.01278.
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Table IX. SCF Predictions(Two Type Model):Adverse Events
Hypothesized variable change
Mean effect on log Percentage point Percentage change
financial benefit(std) marginal effect(std) in the filing rate
Strategic Adverse Strategic Adverse Total Strategic Adverse Total
type type type type type type
Percentage of no work 0.3185 0.1796 0.0091 2.20E-07 0.0014 27 0.003 10.96
-5 percentage points ( 0.113 ) ( 0.0487 ) ( 0.0037 ) ( 6.00E-07 ) ( 0.0006 )
(from mean 23%)
Period of unemployment -1 -3.2235 -0.3191 -0.0315 -3.30E-07 -0.0049 -93.47 -0.004 -38.35
week from mean 2.39 ( 1.5438 ) ( 0.1385 ) ( 0.0104 ) ( 8.50E-07 ) ( 0.0016 )
Percentage with health 0.0079 -0.0246 0.0002 -2.80E-08 3.30E-05 0.59 -3.50E-04 0.26
problems -1 percentage point ( 0.0235 ) ( 0.0136 ) ( 8.00E-05 ) ( 7.40E-08 ) ( 1.30E-05 )
(from mean 4%)
Percentage of divorce -0.2589 -0.0897 -0.0064 -1.00E-07 -0.001 -18.99 -0.001 -7.83
-5 percentage points ( 0.0698 ) ( 0.0335 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 2.60E-07 ) ( 0.0004 )
(from mean 13%)
lower responsiveness to financial benefit in the bankruptcy equation.
Finally, Table X lists the Hausman specification test suggested in Henry, Kita-
mura, and Salanie (2010), and Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011). As described in Table
VI, the full set of type determination variables includes ln(income), number of credit
cards, an indicator for risk aversion, and an index variable for financial savviness
(shopping around). The first column in Table X presents estimates of several key
variables of the model using the full set of W . The second column has the estimation
results without the indicator for risk aversion and the “shopping around” variable.
The test shows that coefficients for all parameters (except type-determination vari-
ables in W ) from the full set of W and from a subset of W are not statistically
different18. This result provides supporting evidence on the specification of the cur-
rent model. Column 3, however, tells a different story. This column is estimated
18The critical value of χ2 at significance level of 99% is 112.
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Table X. Hausman Test
Benchmark model
Without risk averse Without ln income
and shop around and number of cards
ln(income) -0.5552*** -0.5730*** —
Number of credit cards -2.3736*** -2.4796*** —
Risk averse 0.2923 — 2.0280***
Shop around -0.0519 — -0.2146***
Log financial benefit 0.277 0.2739 0.2478
(strategic type) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.0547 ) ( 0.047 )
log financial benefit 0.011 0.0101 0.0847
(adverse type) ( 0.0858 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.065 )
Correlation coefficient -0.5846 -0.5913 -0.6192
(strategic type) ( 0.3285 ) ( 0.3196 ) ( 0.2428 )
Correlation coefficient 0.2581 0.2627 -0.1823
(adverse type) ( 0.4163 ) ( 0.4236 ) ( 0.2988 )
Hausman test statistics — 3.3 9738.35
p-value — 1 0
without the “ln(income)” and “number of credit card” variables. The difference of
coefficient estimates with the estimates from the full set of W is statistically signif-
icant. This contradictory testing result is likely due to the rather weak relationship
between the unobserved type and the risk aversion variable and the shopping around
variable (both of these two variables are statistically insignificant in Table VI).
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1.4. Conclusion
The adverse events and strategic timing hypotheses have received particular atten-
tion in the debate on bankruptcy. Existing work proposes to distinguish between
these hypotheses in a “strict” manner, which does not allow adverse events to affect
probability of filing through the channel of financial benefits.
We propose testing for endogeneity of financial benefit as a distinguishing feature
between the hypotheses. Financial benefit is endogenous to the filing decision for
strategic types, and exogenous for adverse events types. This test allows adverse
events to affect probability of filing in both hypotheses through the channel of financial
benefit.
Using a single-type model, we show that both the PSID and the SCF data support
the adverse events hypothesis.
Extending the analysis to allow for the more realistic case of both types existing
simultaneously, we propose and estimate a mixture-density type model with two
types. We find evidence of both types of behavior in the data. In particular, financial
benefit is endogenous for the strategic type and exogenous for the adverse events
type. On average, about 16 percent of the sample is strategic type, and 84 percent is
adverse events type, providing support for the exogeneity of financial benefit in the
one-type model. These results show a role for both hypotheses. A specification test
provides some supporting evidence of this two-type model.
The estimates here are broadly consistent with theoretical predictions: the prob-
ability of filing and the financial benefit from filing are both larger for strategic type
than for adverse events type. There is some evidence of a “financial-benefits” channel
of the effect of adverse events on filing probability. We also find that marginal effect
of financial benefit on filing probability is larger for the strategic type than for the
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adverse events type.
Notably, the models here are simple, and do not capture all relevant aspects of
the bankruptcy decision. Similarly, data limitations prevent more thorough investi-
gation of these ideas. Additional research on both aspects would help understand the
bankruptcy decision in more detail.
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CHAPTER II
DYNAMIC EFFECT OF TARP ON BANKS’ LOAN TO ASSET RATIO
2.1. Introduction
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is the largest government rescue program
in US history in terms of funds appropriated. Established by the US Treasury in
October 2008 to shore up the financial system after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy,
the ultimate goal of TARP is to stimulate loan supply and restore credit flowing in
the economy. In this chapter, I examine the effect of a key part of the TARP, the
Capital Purchase Program (CPP) on banks’ loan to asset ratio (LTA). I find that
TARP investment significantly boosted banks’ LTA for medium banks, but had no
effect on small or big banks’ LTA.
Although CPP officially closed its investment program not long ago on December
31, 2009, and a substantial amount of money has not yet been returned back to
the government, different evaluations of its true effect on stimulating banks’ LTA
have already emerged. On the one hand, a number of reports showed that TARP
recipients reduced lending after receiving government help, and that consumers and
small business complained about TARP banks withholding capital rather than lending
it out . On the other hand, a few working papers argued positive and strong positive
effect for larger and earlier-recipient banks (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2009) or for
banks with below median Tier 1 ratios (Li 2011).
In this chapter, I provide a comprehensive study of the effect of the CPP (from
now on, TARP). My main result is that, there is no significant effect of TARP on small
banks’ and big banks’ LTA. Taking the period that a bank first got TARP injection
as benchmark, there is a 14 percentage point decrease in medium TARP banks’ LTA.
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Moreover, one dollar of TARP investment leads to 7.71 dollar more loans for them.
When I use credit as an alternative measure, I still find no effect on small banks.
For medium banks, the TARP banks’ credit to asset ratio (CTA) decreases by 5.49%
during the treatment quarter. In terms of a dollar amount, a dollar TARP investment
can be translated into 7.8 dollar more of credit for medium banks. And for large
banks, there is an annual increase of 7.28 percentage point in CTA. One dollar of
TARP investment can be translated into 1.25 dollar more in big banks’ credit.
Previous study uses cross sectional data (Li 2011) or matching non TARP banks
with TARP banks to show the effect of TARP. However, for three reasons, I cannot
draw a simple conclusion from the cross section data or by matching methodology.
First, TARP investments were not randomly assigned to qualifying financial in-
stitutions (QFIs). TARP recipients are systematically different from non-recipients.
For example, TARP recipients had higher level of assets, thus TARP recipients could
have even lower LTA without TARP. Second, to measure the impact of TARP on
bank loan supply, I also need to take into account the economic conditions in TARP
recipients’ service areas, since banks’ LTA would be naturally low in areas with weak
loan demand. Third, loans heavily rely on the historical level, and it takes time to
adjust or make any response.
Further, the evolution of crisis is dynamic, and its influence on banks should be
dynamic, too. Current studies are mostly using cross-sectional data to estimate the
effect of TARP. Instead, this chapter employs panel data to study the dynamic effect
of TARP investments on banks’ LTA. Using panel data enables me to study not only
the size of average treatment effect, but also the time of response in LTA.
I first graphically show the trend of all banks’ LTA through the 11 quarters in
my sample, and see TARP banks’ LTA is higher than non TARP banks’ LTA. Then,
in order to find out the treatment effect of TARP, I focus on the TARP banks and
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adjust the time line according to the treatment date. By comparing the LTA level
before and after TARP, I find some evidence of TARP’s effect for different sizes of
banks.
To establish a statistical inference, I try a set of regression models to uncover
the real effect of TARP on banks’ LTA. First, I use a difference-in-difference model
to estimate the treatment effect in each period by controlling the trend; however,
this model is valid with a strong assumption, that is, to be selected into TARP is a
random experiment. Second, I use a fixed effect model to take care of the individual
bank effect that is included in the error term. And at last, with a dynamic panel
model, I am able to take care of the “dynamic panel bias”.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis quantifying
TARP’s effect on banks’ LTA with panel data. It is related and complementary
to several recent works. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2009) study the allocation of
TARP capital to public banks, which account for less than 10% of all commercial
banks in the US. Taliaferro (2009) studies banks’ self-selection into TARP based on
bank characteristics only, and examines capital structure decisions of TARP banks by
comparing TARP banks with matched non-TARP banks. Duchin and Sosyura (2011)
study the political and regulatory influences on TARP funds distribution. There are
two major differences between this chapter and the paper mentioned above. First,
the panel data allow us to check the dynamic effect of LTA adjustment over time.
Second, my models and specifications are more complete by controlling for not only
bank characteristics, local economic conditions and time trend, but also the history
influence and endogeneity of TARP decision.
This chapter contributes to the literature of financial and banking crisis. Banking
crisis have significant negative effects on real economy, especially on sectors dependent
on bank financing (Kronzner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache,
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and Rajan, 2008). This effect can be largely attributed to the reduction in banks’
credit supply in the economy, which could be a result of “capital crunch” of banks
(Bernanke and Lown 1991). In this chapter, I test if the injection of capital can boost
banks’ LTA during crisis.
The rest of chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2. introduces the TARP
program and CPP in particular. In section 2.3., I introduce the data and the impor-
tant variables that are used in the regressions. Section 2.4. presents with graphs and
find positive evidence of TARP funds. In section 2.5., I show with a set of regres-
sion models and argue that the dynamic panel model is the most appropriate one to
identify the effect of TARP investments on banks’ LTA. Section 2.6. does robustness
check. Section 2.7. provides concluding remarks.
2.2. A Brief Introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) was enacted on October 3, 2008,
in response to the severe financial crisis. TARP includes the following programs:
Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Targeted Investment Program (TIP), Asset Guar-
antee Program (AGP), AIG Investment Program (AIG), Term Asset-Backed Securi-
ties Loan Facility (TALF), Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), Automotive
Industry Financing Program (AIFP) and Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP). I introduce the programs related to banks below.
2.2.1. Bank-Related Programs in TARP
2.2.1.1. Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
Under the CPP, US Treasury invested in banks and other financial institutions to
increase their capital. With the additional capital, CPP participants were better
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equipped to undertake new lending, even while absorbing write downs and charge-
offs on loans that were not performing. Although many banks were fundamentally
sound, because of the capital restraints caused by the troubled market conditions,
they were hesitant to lend. The level of confidence between banks and other financial
institutions was also low, so they were unwilling to lend to each other. Restoring
capital and confidence is essential to allowing the financial system to work effectively
and efficiently1.
The CPP remained open through 2009 for investments in small banks, with terms
aimed at encouraging participation by small community banks that are qualified
financial institutions (QFIs) under CPP terms. The last application deadline under
the CPP was in November 2009 and final closings occurred in December 2009.
Of $204.89 billion invested, as of Oct 31st, 2010, approximately $139.44 billion
has already been repaid and Treasury expects it will result in a positive return for
taxpayers.
2.2.1.2. Targeted Investment Program (TIP)
Treasury established TIP to provide additional assistance on a case-by-case basis in
order to stabilize financial institutions that were critical to the functioning of the
financial system. Through TIP, Treasury purchased $20 billion of preferred stock in
each of Bank of America and Citigroup to prevent a loss of confidence that could have
resulted in significant financial market disruptions, threatened the financial strength
of similar financial institutions, impaired broader financial markets, and undermined
the overall economy. Both institutions fully repaid their TIP funding in the fourth
quarter of calendar year 2009.
1Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) Monthly 105(a) Report– August 2010.
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2.2.1.3. Asset Guarantee Program (AGP)
AGP, like the TIP, was a targeted program aimed at maintaining the stability of
financial institutions whose failure would have harmed the financial system. More
specifically, the AGP provided protection against the risk of significant loss on pools
of assets held by systemically significant financial institutions. By committing to
limit an institution’s exposure to losses on illiquid or distressed assets through AGP,
Treasury helped the institution maintain the confidence of its depositors and other
funding sources, and continue to meet the credit needs of households and businesses.
Treasury used this program to assist Citigroup and also announced a commitment to
assist Bank of America (BOA).
2.2.1.4. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
As part of the Consumer and Business Lending Initiative, the Federal Reserve and
Treasury announced the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) and launched TALF under the Financial Stability Plan on February 10, 2009.
The TALF’s objective is to stimulate investor demand for certain types of eligible
asset-backed securities (ABS), specifically those backed by loans to consumers and
small businesses. TALF has reduced the cost and increased the availability of new
credit to consumers and businesses. Under the TALF, the Federal Reserve can extend
up to $200 billion in three- and five-year non-recourse loans to investors that agree
to purchase eligible consumer or small business ABS. Treasury provides up to $20
billion of TARP funds in credit protection to the Federal Reserve for losses that may
arise under TALF loans.
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2.2.1.5. Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP)
Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, announced PPIP
on March 23, 2009, as a part of the Financial Stability Plan. Under the PPIP, Trea-
sury provides equity and debt financing to newly-formed public-private investment
funds (PPIFs) established by fund managers with investors for the purpose of pur-
chasing legacy securities from financial institutions. These securities are commercial
mortgage-backed securities and non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities.
The Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program is designed, in part,
to support market functioning and facilitate price discovery in the commercial and
non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets, helping banks and
other financial institutions re-deploy capital and extend new credit to households and
businesses. Both residential and commercial MBS are pools of mortgages bundled
together by financial institutions. Rights to receive a portion of the cash generated
by the pools are sold as securities in the financial markets, in the same way a stock
or bond would be sold in financial markets. The term “legacy assets” generally refers
to loans, asset-backed securities, and other types of assets that were originated or
issued before the financial markets for these types of assets deteriorated significantly
in 2008.
In the latter months of 2009, financial market conditions improved, the prices of
legacy securities appreciated, and the results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program enabled banks to raise substantial amounts of capital as a buffer against
weaker than expected economic conditions, all of which enabled Treasury to proceed
with the program at a scale smaller than initially envisioned.
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2.2.1.6. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
Treasury announced a comprehensive $75 billion program, the Home Affordable Mod-
ification Program (HAMP), in February 2009 to help distressed homeowners remain
in their homes and thereby prevent avoidable foreclosures. Treasury is providing up to
$50 billion in funding through the TARP, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed
to provide up to $25 billion of additional funding. The program’s objective is to offer
affordable mortgages to three to four million qualifying homeowners by December
31st, 2012.
2.2.1.7. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP)
The TLG Program includes a guarantee of newly issued senior unsecured debt of
banks, thrifts, and certain holding companies (the Debt Guarantee Program). Entities
that participate in the Debt Guarantee Program are required to notify the FDIC
of any guaranteed debt issuance and to pay the associated assessment premiums.
Additionally, entities that have issued FDIC guaranteed debt at any time since the
inception of the program are required to report the total amount of all outstanding
FDIC-guaranteed debt each month. These instructions provide guidance on how
to report the issuance of FDIC-guaranteed debt and the outstanding amount of all
FDIC-guaranteed debt.
2.2.2. How does the CPP work?
Treasury purchased senior preferred shares and other interests from qualifying U.S.-
controlled banks, savings associations, and other financial institutions. Treasury also
receives warrants to purchase common shares or other securities from the banks.
Banks participating in the CPP pay Treasury dividends on the preferred shares
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at a rate of five percent per year for the first five years following Treasury’s invest-
ment and at a rate of nine percent per year thereafter. S-corporation banks pay an
interest rate of 7.7 percent per year for the first five years and 13.8 percent thereafter.
Preferred shares (or stock) are a form of ownership in a company.
Banks may repay Treasury under the conditions established in the purchase
agreements as amended by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Treasury
also has the right to sell the securities. The repayment price is equal to what Treasury
paid for the shares, plus any unpaid dividends or interest.
When a publicly-traded bank repays Treasury for the preferred stock investment,
the bank has the right to repurchase its warrants. The warrants do not trade on any
market and do not have observable market prices. If the bank wishes to repurchase
warrants, an independent valuation process is used to establish fair market value.
If an institution chooses not to repurchase the warrants, Treasury is entitled to sell
the warrants. In November and December 2009, Treasury began public offerings
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the sale of warrants
using a modified Dutch auction methodology.
Qualifying Financial Institution (QFI) under CPP terms includes (i) any U.S.
bank or U.S savings association not controlled by a Bank Holding Company (“BHC”)
or Savings and Loan Company (“SLHC”); (ii) any top-tier U.S. BHC; (iii)any top-tier
U.S. SLHC which engages solely or predominately in activities that are permitted for
financial holding companies under relevant law; and (iv) any U.S. bank or U.S. savings
association controlled by a U.S. SLHC that does not engage solely or predominately
in activities that are permitted for financial holding companies under relevant law.
QFIs may sell preferred to the UST subject to the limits and terms described as
following: Each QFI may issue an amount of Senior Preferred equal to not less than
1% of its risk-weighted assets and not more than the lesser of (i) $25 billion and (ii)
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3% of its risk-weighted assets.
As of today, there are 707 banks or institutions getting in total of $204.9 billion
from CPP. Of these banks, 82 banks have fully repaid the money to the Treasury
while 8 institutions partially repaid, which makes the total amount of repayment
139.44 billion. In this chapter, I am looking into the effect CPP on QFIs’ loan to
asset ratio, and from now on, I consider that TARP and CPP are equivalent.
2.3. Data and Variables
There are two categories of variables: bank characteristics, local economic environ-
ment. I model banks’ loan to asset ratio using bank characteristics, local economic
conditions and a dummy variable called Ever TARP, which indicates if a bank has
ever received the TARP funds. The health of banks determines banks’ ability to make
loans, and the status of local economic environment affects loan demand for banks.
2.3.1. Bank Characteristics
Bank data are extracted from the quarterly bank balance sheets published in FDIC
website. The balance sheets contain basic financial information and geographic in-
formation for banks operating in US. And I include a total of 11 quarters, i.e. one
year before the crisis (2007Q4) to the most recent quarter Jun 2010 (2010Q2). Since
the TARP investment is made to the headquarter of bank holding companies and
banks, I assume that if a bank holding company was approved for TARP funding,
all of its subsidiary banks received some fraction of the TARP funds. Thus, I sum
up the assets, loans, deposits and etc. of each institution if a bank holding company
has more than one institution, and replace the corresponding variables of the bank
holding company with the sum. In other words, in my sample I only consider the
49
information of the bank holding company for the case of multiple institutions and
leave as it is for single institution case. I append all the 11 quarters by their bank
holding companies’ name or bank name(sometimes, it is necessary to use the state
and city to identify). And I keep only the banks that exist in all 11 quarters. My
final sample consists of 6726 observations each quarter.
The TARP recipient list is from Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) Monthly
105(a) Report–October 2010, United States Department of the Treasury. There are
707 QFIs that received TARP funds by the end of December 2009. I match a TARP
recipient by its bank holding company’s name or institution name to the balance sheet.
In my sample, the recipients include 109 banks and 535 bank holding companies.
The CAMELS ratings are being used by the government in response to the
financial crisis of 2008 to help decide which banks to provide special help for and
which not as part of CPP. The acronym CAMELS refers to the six components of a
bank’s condition: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity
and Sensitivity to market risk.
Since each bank’s CAMELS rating is confidential information, I use several prox-
ies for the elements in CAMELS rating to measure a bank’s condition. Tier 1 ratio,
defined to be Tier 1 (core) capital divided by risk-weighted total assets, is widely
used by regulators to measure a bank’s ability to absorb potential losses on assets
of different risk classes. I use Tier 1 ratio to proxy for a bank’s capital adequacy
(C). I use the troubled assets ratio to approximate a bank’s asset quality (A), which
is computed by adding the amounts of loans past due 90 days or more, non-accrual
loans and other real estate owned (primarily foreclosed property) and dividing that
amount by the bank’s capital and loan loss reserves. Management quality is difficult
to measure. The literature has suggested proxies like the age of a bank, percentage
of insider loans, and the number of corrective actions taken by regulators. Since it is
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a dynamic model that I am using, I choose to use the percentage of insider loans as
my proxy for management quality (M) because of its time-variant property. Earning
(E) is measured by the annualized ROA. Following Hirtle and Lopez (1999), I use the
cash to assets ratio to proxy for liquidity (L). Finally, I approximate the sensitivity
to market risk(S) by the loans to deposits ratio. The loans to deposits ratio measures
the stability of a bank’s funding mix. After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, banks’
funding costs rose substantially with the shutdown of commercial paper markets and
shrinkage of wholesale funding markets. Many banks found it difficult to roll over
their public debt. During this period, deposits became a particularly valuable fund-
ing source for banks (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; and Ivashina
and Scharfstein, 2010). The loans to deposits ratio captures a bank’s sensitivity to
market risk in the crisis.
There are two additional variables that I expect to be related to both the Trea-
sury’s TARP decision and bank loan growth, that is, size of a bank and its exposure
to the real estate market. A bigger bank poses a greater systemic risk to the economy.
With the goal of stabilizing the financial system, the last thing the government wants
to see is the failure of big banks. Thus bank size would be an important factor for
the TARP decision. On the other hand, the current financial crisis is initiated from
the meltdown of the housing markets. A bank’s exposure to the real estate market,
measured as the percentage of real estate loans in a bank’s loan portfolio, could be a
critical factor of its financial conditions during the crisis.
The summary statistics is presented in Table XI. I can see that TARP banks
have a higher level of assets and insider loans but a lower level of tier 1 ratio, which
indicates that size, management and capital quality are the concerns of Treasury’s
TARP decision. Besides, for small and medium banks, TARP banks have a higher
loan to deposit ratio, percentage of estate loans and troubled asset ratio. These
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Table XI. Summary Statistics
All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
TARP No TARP TARP No TARP TARP No TARP TARP No TARP
Loan to asset 1.405 0.79 1.59 0.789 1.02 0.818 0.65 0.705
Log asset 13.16 11.92 12.36 11.73 14.53 14.23 17.47 16.84
Log insider loan 7.97 6.388 7.36 6.281 9.199 7.851 10.59 8.757
ROA 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.0003 0.004
Cash to asset 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005
Loan to deposit 1.733 1.015 1.941 0.972 1.286 1.175 0.946 5.691
Tier 1 ratio 0.092 0.112 0.096 0.112 0.085 0.098 0.077 0.095
Troubled asset ratio 0.202 0.173 0.191 0.171 0.231 0.201 0.232 0.15
Unemployment rate 7.635 7.08 7.577 7.069 7.745 7.226 7.911 7.284
Foreclosure rate 0.198 0.159 0.195 0.157 0.2 0.168 0.226 0.252
# banks 613 6158 439 5758 143 360 38 40
imply that TARP banks are the ones in trouble, or at least more affected by the
crisis. The story is slightly different for big banks: the TARP banks are less sensitive
to the market risk, in which sense they are “healthy banks”, but they are also with
less liquidity and more troubled assets, which means that they are affected by the
depression. Plus, the percentage of big banks and medium banks that receive TARP
funds is much more than that of small banks. This is probably due to the concern of
systemic risk.
2.3.2. Local Economic Environment
The status of local economy correlates with loan demand and could be a determinant
in approving TARP application. Generally, funds should be given to the areas with
large gap between credit demand and supply. I define a state to be a local market.
And I relate a bank to the state where its head quarter locates. For large banks with
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Fig. 1. Fitted Plot of All Banks’ LTA from 2007Q4 to 2010Q2
branches all over the country, the definition of local market is not so appropriate;
thus I use an additional indicator whether a bank has an interstate office to proxy
whether it is a local bank or national bank. Besides, two economic indexes are used:
unemployment rate and foreclosure rate. Unemployment rate is got from US Bureau
of Labor Statistics. It is a traditional indicator of the economic condition and a higher
unemployment often means a need of external funds. Quarterly foreclosure rates are
from Realty Trac. It measures the impact of the crisis on the local market.
2.4. Graphic Analysis
2.4.1. Quarterly LTA change
Fig. 1 is a nonparametric fit of LTA by quarter for all banks in my sample. The
long dashed line shows the LTAs for the TARP recipients and the short dashed line
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Fig. 2. Fitted Plot of Small Banks’ LTA from 2007Q4 to 2010Q2
shows that of non-TARP recipients. Additionally, the grey areas indicate the 95%
confidence intervals for each line. From the figure, the LTA of TARP recipients are
much higher than that of the non-recipients, even at beginning of the sample (4th
quarter of 2007) when TARP was not available. Apparently, which bank gets TARP
is not random. A cross-section study to compare banks with and without TARP will
most likely result in overestimates of the TARP effect.
Further, when I take a closer look at the TARP recipients, their LTA falls all the
way until 2009Q3 and remain stable afterwards. In contrast, the non-recipients are
quite steady before 2009Q1, but began to slide down since then. The figure shows
that the recipients were more affected by the crisis but they seem to be recovering
from the crisis; in contrast, the trend of LTA for non-recipients was quite smooth
with a slight decrease when the economy became worse.
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If I draw the same figure for different sizes of banks, the trend of LTA varies
substantially across different sizes of banks. I divide all banks into three groups,
small, medium, and big. The small banks are those banks with assets below 1 billion,
medium banks are those with assets between 1 billion to 10 billion, and big banks
are those with assets greater than 10 billion. In my sample, there are more than 90%
banks are small banks.
Fig. 2 is the fitted plot of LTA by quarter for small banks. I can see that the
trend is quite similar to that in Fig. 1, especially for the non-recipients. However, the
average LTA of small TARP recipients are a little bit higher than the average LTA of
all the TARP recipients, which suggests that the Treasury may have a higher criterion
for small banks when it makes the TARP decision. Additionally, the turning point of
recipients is one quarter earlier than that in Fig. 1, and the rise is more significant
after 2009Q1, that is when small banks began to get TARP investments.
Fig. 3 shows the change of LTA for medium banks over time. The trend of
medium banks is quite different from the overall trend and from that of small banks.
Both TARP recipients and non-recipients have a declining curve of LTA. Although
the LTA of recipients is much higher than that of non-recipients before the peak of
crisis (2008Q4), their difference in LTA is shrinking over time. During the last quarter
(2010Q2) both of their LTA have decreased to less than 0.7, on average. Obviously,
medium banks have been severely affected by the crisis. And I see that there is
overlapping area between the two confidence intervals, which implies the difference
between LTAs of the two groups may not be significant.
Further, the LTA pattern of big banks is quite different from that of small banks
or medium banks. In Fig. 4, the non-recipients’ average LTA is above that of the
recipients but their difference may not be significant because a large part of the
confidence interval of TARP recipients is overlapped by that of the non-recipients.
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Fig. 3. Fitted Plot of Medium Banks’ LTA from 2007Q4 to 2010Q2
Fig. 4. Fitted Plot of Large Banks’ LTA from 2007Q4 to 2010Q2
56
Fig. 5. Fitted Plot of All Recipient Banks’ LTA by Treatment Period
Besides, the LTAs for big banks, regardless of receiving TARP or not, decreases over
the time. Moreover, I see that the average LTA of big banks is only half of that
of small or medium banks. This indicates that big banks’ lending behavior is quite
different from smaller banks.
2.4.2. Treatment Effect
One problem from the previous graphs is that I ignore the timing of receiving TARP.
Next I explicitly incorporate the timing effect. I redefine the quarter of receiving
TARP to be the zero period of treatment, the first quarter before that to be the -1
period of treatment, the second quarter before that period to be the -2 period, etc..
Further, I define the first quarter after that to be period 1, and 2nd quarter after
that period to be period 2, etc., until the period 4. All periods after the 5th period
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Fig. 6. Fitted Plot of Small Recipient Banks’ LTA by Treatment Period
(including the 5th period) are grouped to be period 5. For non-recipients, I do not
know when they will be treated, so I exclude them in the graphs and only focus on
the TARP recipients.
This enables us to see the average treatment effect of each quarter before and
after the recipients receive TARP funds no matter which quarter they actually receive
it. Figs. 5-8 show the average treatment2 in the TARP banks’ LTAs before and after
receiving the TARP funds.
Fig. 5 plots the sample for all TARP banks, and Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8
plot LTAs for small, medium and large TARP banks, respectively. From Fig. 5, the
overall pattern is that LTA goes up 3 quarters before treatment and then goes down,
and goes up again 3 quarters after the treatment. The local average treatment effect
2Treatment period is period when the bank first receives TARP money.
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Fig. 7. Fitted Plot of Medium Recipient Banks’ LTA by Treatment Period
Fig. 8. Fitted Plot of Large Recipient Banks’ LTA by Treatment Period
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during the treatment period is negative.
A similar pattern for small banks can be found in Fig. 6. The difference between
the overall pattern and the one from the small banks is that small banks turn “up”
after the first period while for all TARP banks, the recovery did not occur until the
third period after treatment.
The pattern for the medium banks, however, is a totally different story. The
TARP banks’ LTA is declining over time. There is a jump during the treatment
period and the declining rate is even faster after the treatment. This implies that the
capital injection of TARP provides the medium bank a positive shock but the banks
were reluctant to lend when the crisis turns from bad to worse.
For large banks, their LTAs are going down slowly as a whole and there is a turn-
ing point during the 3rd period after TARP. Ever since then, LTA goes up straight.
I also see that there is a small drop comparing the LTAs before and after treatment.
I also plot fitted log loan change before and after receiving TARP in Fig. 9, Fig.
10, Fig. 11, and Fig. 12. I do not observe significant jump during the treatment
period except a slight one for medium TARP banks. An important fact is that
after 3 quarters of treatment, small banks have an increasing trend in loans, but
both medium and big banks keep their loan almost the same level as the treatment
quarter. Combined this fact with the asset growth of TARP banks trend in each
category (there are steady growth in assets for small and medium banks, but big
banks’ assets remain unchanged through the sample), I expect that TARP should
have no effect on big banks’ LTA, some negative effect on medium banks’ LTA, and
an unknown effect on small banks’ LTA.
Although I see a negative local average treatment effect in LTA around the
treatment period, the real treatment effect could be a lagged one on loans. Moreover,
I do not control all the other important factors described in Section 2.3.. I will take
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Fig. 9. Fitted Plot of All Banks’ Log Loans by Treatment Period
Fig. 10. Fitted Plot of Small Banks’ Log Loans by Treatment Period
61
Fig. 11. Fitted Plot of Medium Banks’ Log Loans by Treatment Period
Fig. 12. Fitted Plot of Large Banks’ Log Loans by Treatment Period
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care of these concerns and try to identify the local treatment effect for each period
in the next section.
2.5. Regression Analysis
The figures above suggest a clear link between the treatment of receiving TARP and
the LTA, but they do not provide a framework for formal statistical inference. In
this section, I will apply different regression models to find out the average effect of
TARP on LTA. First, I assume the Treasury’s TARP decision is random, i.e. there is
no selection to be a TARP bank or not. With this assumption, I use the difference-
in-difference model to identify the treatment effect of TARP on LTAs. To deal with
the individual bank effect, I apply fixed effect model and dynamic panel model. Since
the Treasury’s TARP decision might be correlated with loan supply and demand for
banks, TARP investments are endogenous to LTA. I then relax the assumption made
in difference-in-difference model and take care of the endogeneity problem. I report
the results of the above regressions in the subsections.
2.5.1. Difference–in–difference Model
In the difference-in-difference model, before I estimate the effect of TARP investments
on LTA, I need to make an assumption on the treatment-to be treated or not is a
random experiment. In my case, I assume the Treasury randomly chooses banks
among each category to enter the TARP.
The Treasury wants to promote credit floating in the economy by injecting capital
into banks, expecting that, with a strengthened capital base, TARP banks would be
able to make more loans to business and consumers.
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Table XII. Difference-in-difference Model, Dependent Variable LTAit
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag LTA 0.577*** 0.171* 0.499*** 0.742***
4th period after TARP 0.150* 0.124*** -0.152 0.0707
3rd period after TARP 0.0663 0.0775* -0.205 0.0466
2nd period after TARP 0.0172 0.0499* -0.138 0.0753
1st period after TARP -0.00976 0.0181 -0.0673 0.123*
1st period before TARP 0.0607 0.0288 -0.231* 0.0673
2nd period before TARP 0.0805 0.0384 -0.260* 0.0529
3rd period before TARP 0.00681 0.0116 -0.175 0.0407
4th period before TARP -0.0707 -0.02 -0.274** -0.00925
Ever TARP 0.105* -0.036 0.309** -0.0313
Log asset -0.0799*** -0.0479*** -0.162*** -0.0278**
Log insider loan -0.00138 0.00138 -0.0224*** 0.00879**
ROA -0.332 -0.165 18.88*** 9.253*
Cash to asset 4.304*** 1.080* -1.428 3.252*
Loan to deposit 0.251*** 0.682*** 0.0965* 0.000774
%Real estate loan 0.226*** 0.0387 0.135*** -0.0088
Tier 1 ratio -1.048*** -1.879*** -3.081*** 0.196
Troubled asset ratio 0.00987 -0.00756 0.175** 0.126**
Unemployment rate -0.000924 0.00226* 0.00286 0.0115
Foreclosure rate -0.0219 -0.0502* 0.181** -0.00267
Quarter 3 0.0124 0.0132 -0.0524 -0.0371
Quarter 4 -0.0238 -0.00184 -0.103** -0.0722
Quarter 5 -0.0119 -0.00132 -0.0832 0.00442
Quarter 6 -0.00218 0.00696 -0.0695 -0.122
Quarter 7 0.0157 0.00685 -0.059 -0.0684
Quarter 8 -0.0118 0.000909 -0.149** -0.0499
Quarter 9 -0.0116 0.00268 -0.102* -0.101**
Quarter 10 -0.011 0.00531 -0.184** -0.0699
Quarter 11 0.0133 0.0141* -0.132** -0.126**
Constant 0.991*** 0.706*** 2.879*** 0.456**
Observations 67,256 61,605 4,881 770
R-squared 0.83 0.955 0.87 0.711
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For the ith bank, its tth quarter LTA can be written as:
LTAit = λLTAit−1 + αXit + βEverTARPi +
5∑
k=−5
γkDik
+quarter dummies+ µi + eit where γ0 = 0
where LTAit−1 is the lagged loan to asset ratio of ith bank. LTA has a lagged response
to change, thus LTA of the tth quarter should be partially determined by its historical
LTA. Xit, is a set of control variables, including the bank characteristics and local
economic environment. EverTARPi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank i
is a TARP recipient, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of EverTARPi shows the
average difference of LTA of TARP recipients and non TARP recipients. I also add
quarter dummies to control for the trend in each quarter. The treatment period
dummies are added to capture the adjustment in each period. I define Dik equal to
1 if it is the ith TARP bank tth quarter after receiving the TARP funds, and zero
otherwise. Additionally, I normalize Di0 equal to 0 for all so that the treatment
period is the benchmark case for comparison. Also, I allow individual fixed effect and
an idiosyncratic error term. The result is reported in Table XII.
There is no significant effect for the overall sample until the 4th period after
they received TARP funds. When I go to sub cases, it seems that TARP investments
only have effect on small banks. The effect becomes significant from the 2nd quarter
after treatment. For medium banks, there is a huge jump up during the period of
treatment and LTA decreases since then, which is consistent with what I find in
section 2.4.. Besides, for large banks, there is an increase in LTA during the 1st
period of treatment, and it is marginally significant.
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Table XIII. Fixed Effect model, Dependent Variable LTAit
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag LTA 0.200*** 0.0734* 0.326*** 0.0675**
4th period after TARP 0.0706 0.114** -0.223* -0.014
3rd period after TARP 0.059 0.0814 -0.156 0.0236
2nd period after TARP 0.0369 0.0526* -0.056 0.018
1st period after TARP 0.00509 0.0199 -0.0121 0.000881
1st period before TARP 0.0408 0.0169 -0.253** 0.0223
2nd period before TARP 0.0348 0.0115 -0.286* 0.0394
3rd period before TARP -0.0197 -0.0182 -0.231** 0.0352
4th period before TARP -0.0483 -0.0653 -0.309*** 0.0883*
Log asset -1.039*** -0.407* -1.035*** -0.354***
Log insider loan -0.00745 -0.00133 0.00234 -0.00499
ROA 0.145 -0.0731 20.02*** 11.26**
Cash to asset 1.429 -0.55 -1.668 1.714
Loan to deposit 0.244* 0.634*** 0.1 -0.000973***
%Real estate loan -0.0805 -0.0955 -1.130* -0.238
Tier 1 ratio -4.014*** -4.549*** -8.588*** -0.543
Troubled asset ratio -0.0214 -0.0183 0.0263 0.324**
Unemployment rate -0.0021 -0.00910** -0.0282 0.0102
Foreclosure rate -0.0559 -0.156** 0.0996 -0.00234
Quarter 3 0.0315*** 0.0306* -0.0201 -0.0326
Quarter 4 0.0246 0.0256* -0.0362 -0.0254
Quarter 5 0.0482*** 0.0360** 0.0249 0.016
Quarter 6 0.0662*** 0.0594*** 0.117 0.00579
Quarter 7 0.0896*** 0.0694*** 0.168* -0.0198
Quarter 8 0.0815*** 0.0705*** 0.114 -0.0392
Quarter 9 0.0933*** 0.0742*** 0.202* -0.0372
Quarter 10 0.0878*** 0.0728*** 0.186 -0.0533
Quarter 11 0.107*** 0.0734*** 0.282** -0.0558
Constant 13.42*** 5.534* 16.98*** 6.796***
Observations 67,256 61,605 4,881 770
R-squared 0.509 0.835 0.697 0.742
Number of banks 6,728 6,162 489 77
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2.5.2. Fixed Effect Model
One immediate problem in applying the difference-in-difference model, is that LTAit−1
is endogenous to the error term, which gives rise to “dynamic panel bias”. To see
this, consider the possibility that a bank has some behavioral characteristics, which
we did not observe, so that the shock goes into the individual bank effect. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the TARP banks are with a higher LTA than the non
TARP banks, and it could be the case that some unobserved variables lead to such a
difference. The positive correlation between treatment of TARP and the unobserved
individual bank effect implies that the OLS estimator is over-estimated for all banks
case and small banks case. I do not observe significant difference in LTAs between
TARP banks and non TARP banks in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, so the OLS estimators are
biased to an unknown direction for medium banks and big banks.
I use the fixed effect model to remove the individual fixed effect. SinceEverTARPi
is a time-invariant variable, it will be dropped after demeaning. The result is reported
in Table XIII. I see a significant and positive effect of TARP on small banks’ LTA in
the 2nd and 4th quarter after they received TARP investments. For medium banks,
the jump in the treatment period persists and the declining trend of LTAs becomes
marginally significant at the 4th period of treatment. And there is no significant
effect on big banks.
Fixed effect regression does the within group transformation, but this does not
eliminate dynamic panel bias. Under the within group transformation, the demeaned
lagged dependent variable LTAit−1 − 110
∑11
t=2 LTAit−1 is still correlated with the
demeaned error term eit − 111
∑11
t=1 eit.
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Table XIV. Dynamic Panel model, Dependent Variable LTAit
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag LTA 0.109*** 0.0469*** 0.324*** 0.0602***
4th period after TARP 0.014 0.00939 -0.140*** -7.43E-05
3rd period after TARP 0.0245** 0.0119 -0.0728*** 0.00498
2nd period after TARP 0.0283** 0.00529 -0.0235 -0.000445
1st period after TARP 0.012 0.005 -0.0101 -0.0105
1st period before TARP -0.0242* -0.00684 -0.120*** 0.0126
2nd period before TARP -0.0337** -0.00366 -0.143*** 0.0308***
3rd period before TARP -0.0295 -0.00299 -0.127*** 0.0317**
4th period before TARP -0.0561** -0.0496** -0.146*** 0.0385***
Log asset -0.400*** -0.211*** -1.669*** -0.360***
Log insider loan 0.00262 -0.000286 0.0378*** -0.0114***
ROA -0.172*** -0.206*** 13.91*** 12.18***
Cash to asset 0.0416 -1.072*** -1.246*** 3.064***
Loan to deposit 0.587*** 0.704*** 0.170*** -0.000668**
%Real estate loan -0.0264 -0.011 -1.126*** -0.434***
Tier 1 ratio -4.783*** -2.500*** -10.21*** 0.130*
Troubled asset ratio -0.0119 -0.000636 0.165*** 0.435***
Unemployment rate -0.00292 -0.000994 -0.0381*** -0.00681***
Foreclosure rate -0.0316 -0.0497 0.128** 0.0481***
Quarter 3 0.0154*** 0.0111*** 0.0214 -0.0168***
Quarter 4 0.0101 0.00868** 0.0427** -0.0077
Quarter 5 0.008 0.0117** 0.119*** 0.0233***
Quarter 6 0.0174 0.0183** 0.252*** 0.0613***
Quarter 7 0.0158 0.0229** 0.302*** 0.0505***
Quarter 8 0.0159 0.0243** 0.320*** 0.0311***
Quarter 9 0.0196 0.0292*** 0.381*** 0.0253**
Quarter 10 0.0206 0.0289*** 0.369*** 0.00779
Quarter 11 0.0249* 0.0294*** 0.482*** -0.00302
Observations 60,524 55,439 4,392 693
Number of banks 6,726 6,161 488 77
68
2.5.3. Dynamic Panel Model
To address the endogeneity of both the lagged LTA with unobserved factors, we
apply the two step GMM regression, which uses further lags of LTA as instruments
for lagged LTA. The result is shown in Table XIV.
Under dynamic panel model, there is a positive and significant effect in 2nd
and 3rd quarter after treatment for the recipients as a whole. And there is also a 2
percentage point increase in LTA during the treatment period.
For small TARP banks, there is no significant effect of TARP. From Table XI, I
see that the TARP recipients under this category are selected using a stricter criterion
and it could be that these TARP banks are more aggressive than the others. Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010) suggest that more vulnerable banks cut lending more than
others because these banks lend to firms whose loan demand fell more during the
crisis. Small banks, most of which are local banks (5% of small banks have interstate
offices), usually rank high in the local market share. One of the possible reasons for no
significant effect on small TARP banks’ LTAs, is that their loan demand is relatively
stable and they were having a steady growth in both loan and asset.
For medium banks, I also observe a jump in the period that they got the TARP
funds, but the size of the jump is much smaller than that in difference-in-difference
model or fixed effect model-an average 12 percentage points increase in LTA from the
previous period. There is highly statistically significant and negative effect of TARP
on recipients’ LTAs in 3rd and 4th quarter of treatment. The LTA of TARP banks
decreases by 14 percentage points after a year of investments, and the LTA stays at a
similar level with 4th quarter before TARP, that is two years ago. The result implies
that the TARP banks in this category sit on the TARP investment and reluctant
to lend. One of the possible reasons is that these banks spend the money to enrich
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their capital base. When I compare the TARP banks with the non TARP banks, I
find TARP banks’ assets has a lower growth rate with a stable loan level, while non
TARP banks’ loans grow at a positive rate. This implies that these TARP recipients
might be the ones that need help.
For large banks, there is no significant effect on average. In terms of large banks,
the TARP investments were more targeting on the goal to stabilize the financial
system, because of the systemic risk. Comparing TARP banks with the non TARP
banks, I see almost no growth in either loans or assets for the recipients. And inversely,
the non TARP banks were able to have growth on both loans and assets.
I also run a Sargan/Hansen test for joint validity of the instruments. For all
banks, the Sargan test of chi-square statistic is 80.26, which reject the null hypothesis
at 1% significance level. For the small and medium banks, the Sargan test of chi-
square statistics are 74.84 and 104.0806, both of which reject the null hypothesis at
1% significance level. And the statistic is 55.84 under cases of big banks, for which I
cannot reject the null.
Another concern is the autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term. So
I run an autocorrelation test. I can reject the null for small, medium and large banks
at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. But I cannot reject the null for
the whole sample.
In terms of a dollar amount, if I replace the treatment dummy with the TARP
investment amount to asset ratio during the five periods after TARP (Table XV),
the effect on LTA becomes clearer. One thing to notice is that now I no longer
use the treatment period as the benchmark, instead, I compare the LTA level after
TARP with the average level of LTA before TARP. For small banks, one dollar of
TARP funds leads to 0.04 and 0.02 dollar fewer loans in treatment quarter and the
1st quarter after treatment, respectively, but it turns out to be 0.02 dollar more loans
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Table XV. Dynamic Panel Model with TARP Investment/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag LTA 0.108*** 0.0468*** 0.327*** 0.0588***
Log asset -0.397*** -0.209*** -1.393*** -0.358***
Log insider loan 0.00253 -0.000223 0.0569*** -0.0108***
ROA -0.157*** -0.193*** 15.56*** 12.41***
Cash to asset 0.114 -0.958*** -2.727*** 2.875***
Loan to deposit 0.589*** 0.705*** 0.153*** -0.000630***
%Real estate loan -0.0264 -0.0111 -0.765** -0.426***
Tier 1 ratio -4.794*** -2.496*** -9.415*** 0.103
Troubled asset ratio -0.012 -0.000477 0.0687** 0.436***
Unemployment rate -0.00282 -0.000927 -0.0340*** -0.00660***
Foreclosure rate -0.0296 -0.0493 0.0583 0.0512***
4th period after TARP, -2.84E-06 2.43e-05** 0.00771*** 7.82E-05
TARP investment/asset
3rd period after TARP, -1.09E-05 -1.54E-06 0.00938*** -8.40E-05
TARP investment/asset
2nd period after TARP, -4.59E-06 -2.61E-06 0.0127*** -0.000503
TARP investment/asset
1st period after TARP, -4.93E-05 -2.69e-05** 0.0104*** -0.00115**
TARP investment/asset
0 period after TARP, -7.22E-05 -4.35e-05** 0.00773*** -0.000257
TARP investment/asset
Quarter 3 0.0152*** 0.0109** 0.0171 -0.0175***
Quarter 4 0.01 0.00886* 0.0370** -0.0177***
Quarter 5 0.00857 0.0116** 0.0884*** 0.00808
Quarter 6 0.0195* 0.0190*** 0.201*** 0.0516***
Quarter 7 0.0191 0.0238** 0.241*** 0.0388***
Quarter 8 0.0199 0.0253** 0.238*** 0.0171
Quarter 9 0.0232 0.0302*** 0.296*** 0.00743
Quarter 10 0.0241 0.0302*** 0.277*** -0.0124
Quarter 11 0.0282** 0.0306*** 0.367*** -0.0226**
Observations 60,524 55,439 4,392 693
Number of banks 6,726 6,161 488 77
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Table XVI. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: Real Estate Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP 0.00377 0.00835 -0.0195 0.00674
4th period after TARP -0.00241 0.0029 -0.00193 0.0139*
3rd period after TARP 5.20E-05 0.00109 0.00478 0.0102
2nd period after TARP 0.0035 0.00597 -0.000518 0.00199
1st period before TARP -0.00186 -0.00262 -0.0127* 0.0192***
2nd period before TARP -0.0114 -0.00877 -0.0249*** 0.0306***
3rd period before TARP -0.0138 -0.0136 -0.0187** 0.0334***
4th period before TARP -0.0331** -0.0231 -0.0307** 0.0338***
Observations 59,632 54,646 4,302 684
Number of banks 6,626 6,072 478 76
Table XVII. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: Residential Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP 0.00108 0.0038 0.000205 0.0123**
4th period after TARP 0.00424 0.00342 0.000489 0.0105
3rd period after TARP 0.00186 0.000218 0.00133 0.00616
2nd period after TARP 0.00429 0.00244 0.000674 -0.00191
1st period before TARP -0.00158 -0.000795 -0.00332 0.00372
2nd period before TARP -0.00936*** -0.00774* -0.00543** 0.00676
3rd period before TARP -0.0107** -0.00966** -0.00519 0.00128
4th period before TARP -0.0176*** -0.0211*** -0.00566 -0.00942
Observations 59,632 54,646 4,302 684
Number of banks 6,626 6,072 478 76
72
Table XVIII. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: Farmland Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP 0.00031 0.000959 0.000337 -0.00688***
4th period after TARP 0.00193* 0.00256* 0.0015 -0.00361***
3rd period after TARP 0.00141 0.00232 0.000778 -0.00368***
2nd period after TARP 0.00056 0.000744 0.000225 -0.00343***
1st period before TARP -0.00152 -0.000678 -0.00240*** 0.00224***
2nd period before TARP -0.00258** -0.00185 -0.00231*** 0.00365***
3rd period before TARP -0.00356** -0.00243* -0.00232** 0.00712***
4th period before TARP -0.00416** -0.00398* -0.00197** 0.0131***
Observations 53,540 49,337 3,654 549
Number of banks 5,955 5,488 406 61
after a year of treatment. This boosting effect is more noticeable for medium banks.
There is an annually 7.71 dollar more loans being generated for every TARP dollar
invested. Beside, the effect is positive and significant since the treatment quarter.
Still, there is no significant effect on big banks.
As a whole, I see a stimulating effect of TARP for all the recipients. And this
stimulating effect is particularly significant for medium banks. In my sample, 30%
medium banks and 62% big banks have interstate offices, which implies that there is
possible variation in the loan demand. With the capital injection of TARP, banks
might be able to stabilize their capital base and adjust their loan supply as a whole.
I further probe into the sources of loan change by checking different categories
of loans, including real estate loans, 1-4 family residential loans, farmland loans,
commercial and industrial(C&I) loans, consumer loans and credit card loans(Tables
XVI-XXI). I do not have data of C&I loans in 2009Q2, so a couple of treatment
quarter dummies are dropped. For small banks, there is only an increase in farmland
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Table XIX. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: C&I Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP -0.0105 -0.000636 -0.00901 -0.0203
4th period after TARP -0.00596 0.00165 -0.00562 0
3rd period after TARP -0.00294 0.00243 -0.00833
2nd period after TARP -7.67E-06 0.00474 -0.00358 -0.00413
1st period before TARP 0.00138 0.00329 -0.00606*** 0.00604*
2nd period before TARP 0.00297 0.00905** -0.00879*** 0.00631*
3rd period before TARP 0.00198 0.00698 -0.00775*** 0.00629
4th period before TARP 0.000321 0.003 -0.00783** 0.00395
Observations 39,754 36,430 2,868 456
Number of banks 6,626 6,072 478 76
loans. For medium banks, no significant effect is found after treatment except an
annual 0.21 percentage point decrement in credit card loans. For large banks, the
evidence is mixed. A marginally significant increment in real estate loans, an annual
1.23 percentage point increment in residential loans, 0.81 percentage point increment
in consumer loans and 0.653 percentage point increment in credit card loans are found
significant in the result. But I also find an annual decrement of 0.688% in farmland
loans.
2.6. Robustness Check
In this section, I conduct several robustness checks to make sure my results are not
driven by other potential confounding factors.
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Table XX. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: Consumer Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP 0.00161 0.00174 0.000111 0.00807***
4th period after TARP 0.00145* 0.00154 0.000445 0.00573***
3rd period after TARP 0.000199 7.29E-06 9.11E-05 0.00151
2nd period after TARP 0.000557 0.00051 0.000219 0.00116
1st period before TARP -0.00115* -0.000723 -0.00462*** -0.00185*
2nd period before TARP -0.00308*** -0.00284** -0.00555*** -0.00138
3rd period before TARP -0.00377*** -0.00282** -0.00621*** -0.000183
4th period before TARP -0.00352*** -0.00298* -0.00556*** 0.00414**
Observations 59,632 54,646 4,302 684
Number of banks 6,626 6,072 478 76
Table XXI. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: Credit Card Loan/asset
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
5th period after TARP -2.95E-07 1.53E-05 -0.00209*** 0.00653***
4th period after TARP 3.09E-05 2.50E-05 -0.000313 0.00362***
3rd period after TARP 4.11E-05 9.05E-06 -0.000112 0.000663
2nd period after TARP -8.65E-06 1.50E-05 0.000357 0.000816*
1st period before TARP 1.71E-05 -2.53E-05 -0.00281*** -0.00214***
2nd period before TARP -3.74E-05 -4.94E-05 -0.00339*** -0.000681
3rd period before TARP -2.46E-05 -3.95E-05 -0.00412*** 0.00059
4th period before TARP -0.000111 -9.84E-05 -0.00397*** 0.00274***
Observations 59,632 54,646 4,302 684
Number of banks 6,626 6,072 478 76
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2.6.1. Announcement Day
The above results are calculated using the date that TARP banks reported to receive
the funds. A potential concern is the self-fulfillment effect: when a bank expects
to receive TARP funds some day in the future, it may begin increasing its lending.
To address this concern, I use the announcement date instead. The result does not
change, since most of the announcement date and receiving date are in the same
quarter.
2.6.2. Instruments for Ever TARP
The Treasury’s TARP decisions were correlated with bank characteristics and local
economic environment, and the unobserved factors in TARP decisions is something
I cannot fully control for. Thus, I employ instrument variables to address the endo-
geneity problem. And the instrument variables I adopt are political and regulatory
connections.
Political interference might play a role in the TARP funds distribution, as WSJ
reported:“The goal of aiding only banks healthy enough to lend... clearly seems to
have shifted ...Part of the problem is that some powerful politicians have used their
leverage to try to direct federal millions toward banks in their home states.” However,
political or regulatory connections were unlikely to directly influence banks’ operating
strategies or to be correlated with the level of local loan demand. So it is reasonable
to assume that political and regulatory connections affected bank loan only through
TARP. Still, I will check whether the instruments are weak instruments.
The evaluation of TARP application was not transparent. There were only two
guidelines on banks’ qualification for TARP investment: (1) Banks were healthy
as determined by their regulators, and (2) dividends paid on common stock and
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compensation packages for bank executives must satisfy certain conditions. There
guidelines are difficult for an outsider to tell whether a bank should receive TARP.
It is widely speculated that other factors beside bank health and local economic
conditions were involved in TARP funds distribution. Anecdotes suggested that pow-
erful politicians exerted their influence to help weak banks get TARP funds.
One possible channel of political influence on TARP decisions was through Rep-
resentatives. I use two variables to capture the political influence through the Rep-
resentative channel. The first one is the percentage of campaign contribution from
local Financial Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) industry in total contribution re-
ceived by a Representative in the 2008 election cycle. A larger percentage means
a Representative relies more on local FIRE’s support in the campaign. In turn,
the Representative will probably push harder for the FIRE industries’ interest. The
second one is a dummy that indicate if a Representative sat on the Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, which supervises all federal banking
regulators. The Representative would be more effective in pushing federal banking
regulators and the Treasury if she sat on the subcommittee.
The House Representatives committee assignment data are obtained from the
House website. There are 71 Representatives sitting on the Financial Services Com-
mittee in 111th Congress, 45 of which were on the Subcommittee on Financial In-
stitutions and Consumer credit. I identify 321 banks in the sample headquartered
in the state of the committee members, and 189 of which are located in the state of
subcommittee members.
I obtain the campaign contribution data from the Center For Responsive Politics
(CRP). The CRP compiles and publishes PACs and individual political contribution
data for each congress member in every 2-year election cycle. Individual contributors’
industries are identified in the CRP data based on their employees. I compute the
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percentage of donation from local FIRE industries(both from individual and PACs)
in the total contribution received by each Representatives in the 2008 election.
Another channel that I consider is a bank’s connection to the Federal Reserve
Banks. The Fed member banks and bank holding companies must submit their TARP
applications to the Fed, and the Treasury’s TARP decisions would be based upon the
Fed recommendations. A bank with Fed connection, thus might be treated more
favorably in the Fed evaluation process.
Following Duchin and Sosyura (2011), I assume a bank was connected to the Fed
if an executive of the bank served as director of a Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) or of
a branch of a FRB. Each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks has a nine-member board.
Representing the banking industry, the three Class A directors are usually senior
executives of member banks. By the Fed’s rule, three Class A directors of a Federal
Reserve Bank have to be from large, medium, and small size banks, respectively. Each
of the 24 branches of the Federal Reserve Banks has a board of five or seven directors,
which are appointed by its parent bank and the Board of Governors. Usually one or
two directors on a Federal Reserve Bank branch’s board are bank executives.
The list of directors for each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and their 24
branches is obtained from the Fed’s website. There are 67 banks in my sample that
are considered to have connections to the Fed.
Besides campaign contribution and committee assignments, ideology might also
play a role. Republicans were thought to be, in general, more opposed to government
bailouts of private firms. To control for the ideology issue, I include a Democrat
dummy, which equals 1 if a Representative was a Democrat.
To address this endogeneity problem, I use the political connection as instru-
ments as explaining the probability of receiving TARP funds. To add variation in
time dimension, I interact political and regulatory connections with quarter dummy
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Table XXII. Weak IV Test
All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Chi-squared statistic 14.5 9.36 9.2 12.26
Cragg-Donald Wald 10.14 5.58 2.37 3
F statistic
Critical value of 5% 21.42
maximal IV relative bias
Critical value of 10% 11.34
maximal IV relative bias
variables. The equation is written as
P (EverTARPi = 1) = δ ∗ Zit + θ ∗ political − connectioni+
ϑ ∗ political − connectioni ∗ quarter − dummies+ it
where Zit is bank characteristics variables, used in Section 2.5.. Before proceeding
to the second stage of regression, I have to make sure that the instruments are valid
and strong. Four instruments are considered here: a dummy for a local Represen-
tative having a seat on Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, a local Democratic
Representative indicator, local FIRE industries’ portion of campaign contribution to
a Representative, and a Fed connection dummy. The Weak IV test result is reported
in Table XXII. I conduct Cragg-Donald Wald test. Under all cases, I cannot reject
the null at the 5% level of significance, which means that there is an issue of weak IV.
And that is why I did not include these instruments in my specification in Section
2.5..
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Table XXIII. Dynamic Panel Model, Dependent Variable: CTA
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag 0.659*** 0.641*** 0.704*** 0.0750***
Log asset -0.592*** -0.373*** -0.528*** -0.208***
Log insider loan -0.0018 -0.00192 -0.0380*** -0.0182***
ROA -1.622*** 0.245** 3.032*** 2.038***
Cash to asset -0.851** -2.672*** 20.33*** 25.97***
Loan to deposit 0.281*** 0.557*** -0.00168 0.00607***
%Real estate loan 0.0206 0.0714 0.47 -0.757***
Tier 1 ratio -1.269*** -1.652*** 6.869*** 8.612***
Troubled asset ratio 0.00661 0.00883 0.161*** 1.037***
Unemployment rate -0.00038 0.000769 0.00485 -0.0212***
Foreclosure rate -0.00134 -0.0466* 0.115*** -0.0499***
5th period after TARP 0.0226 0.0174 0.023 0.0728***
4th period after TARP 0.0121 0.0155 -0.00467 0.0133
3rd period after TARP 0.00866 0.0165 -0.00722 -0.0380**
2nd period after TARP 0.0107 0.012 -0.0144 -0.015
1st period before TARP -0.00343 -0.0126 0.0549*** 0.0724***
2nd period before TARP -0.0216 -0.0274 0.0256 0.127***
3rd period before TARP -0.0201 -0.0292 0.0434** 0.169***
4th period before TARP -0.0201 -0.0445 0.0207 0.176
Quarter 3 0.0181*** 0.0140*** -0.000848 0.0190*
Quarter 4 0.0252*** 0.0101* -0.0338*** 0.0359**
Quarter 5 0.0242*** 0.00869 -0.0344*** 0.0249
Quarter 6 0.0292** 0.0126 0.00772 0.111***
Quarter 7 0.0373*** 0.0145 0.0277 0.0781***
Quarter 8 0.0389*** 0.0155 0.00931 -0.021
Quarter 9 0.0452*** 0.0260** -0.0432** -0.104***
Quarter 10 0.0486*** 0.0271** -0.0215 -0.109***
Quarter 11 0.0574*** 0.0306** 0.0107 -0.164***
Observations 53,540 49,337 3,654 549
Number of banks 5,955 5,488 406 61
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2.6.3. Alternative Loan Measure
Additional to total on-balance loan value, there is an alternative measure of credit,
which is defined as the sum of on-balance sheet loans and off-balance sheet unused
loan commitments and letters of credit. Similarly, when I use the credit to asset ratio
(CTA) as the dependent variable, and replace LTA with CTA, the result is shown in
Table XXIII.
I see a slightly different result from Table XIV. There is no significant effect for
small banks compared to what I find in Table XIV. For medium banks, the TARP
banks’ CTAs decrease by 5.49% during the treatment quarter.
In terms of a dollar amount(Table XXIV), a dollar TARP investment can be
translated into 7.8 dollar more of credit for medium banks. Conversely, for large
banks, there is an annual increase of 7.28 percentage point in CTA. One dollar of
TARP investment can be translated into 1.25 dollar more in large banks’ credit.
2.7. Conclusion
The Capital Purchase Program, the core of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, was
designed to stabilize the banking system by injecting up to $250 billion into qualifying
financial institutions. The stated goal of TARP is to strengthen the capital base of
economically sound but financial distressed banks, and to promote bank lending.
This chapter adds to the literature of recent studies on TARP by using a dynamic
perspective to see the TARP’s effect on banks’ LTA. I find that there is no significant
effect of TARP on small banks’ and big banks’ LTA. Taking the treatment period as
benchmark, there is a 14 percentage point decrease in medium TARP banks’ LTA.
Moreover, one dollar of TARP investment leads to 7.71 dollar more loans for them.
When I use credit as an alternative measure, I still find no effect on small banks.
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Table XXIV. Dynamic Panel Model with TARP Investment/asset, Dependent Vari-
able CTA
VARIABLES All banks Small banks Medium banks Large banks
Lag CTA 0.659*** 0.641*** 0.706*** 0.0677***
Log asset -0.592*** -0.373*** -0.523*** -0.203***
Log insider loan -0.00176 -0.00179 -0.0370*** -0.0181***
ROA -1.624*** 0.240** 2.784*** 1.862***
Cash to asset -0.856*** -2.688*** 20.39*** 26.48***
Loan to deposit 0.281*** 0.556*** -0.00294 0.00595***
%Real estate loan 0.0213 0.0713 0.308 -0.709***
Tier 1 ratio -1.279*** -1.645*** 6.760*** 8.489***
Troubled asset ratio 0.0066 0.00894 0.143*** 1.045***
Unemployment rate -0.000336 0.000832 0.00993** -0.0165***
Foreclosure rate -0.0012 -0.0452* 0.133*** -0.0250**
5th period after TARP, 2.79E-06 1.70E-06 0.00780*** 0.00125
TARP investment/asset
4th period after TARP, 2.38E-06 1.62E-06 0.00478*** -0.00205***
TARP investment/asset
3rd period after TARP, 1.85E-06 1.11E-06 0.00153*** -0.00424***
TARP investment/asset
2nd period after TARP, 1.62E-06 1.00E-06 -0.00484*** -0.00374***
TARP investment/asset
1st period after TARP, 1.30E-06 1.03E-06 0.00401*** -0.00303***
TARP investment/asset
Quarter 3 0.0177*** 0.0138*** -0.00945 -0.0176***
Quarter 4 0.0251*** 0.0101* -0.0414*** -0.0438***
Quarter 5 0.0247*** 0.00928 -0.0551*** -0.0598***
Quarter 6 0.0304** 0.014 -0.0127 0.0164
Quarter 7 0.0389*** 0.0166 0.00211 -0.0268
Quarter 8 0.0408*** 0.018 -0.0386* -0.131***
Quarter 9 0.0475*** 0.0286** -0.104*** -0.226***
Quarter 10 0.0514*** 0.0298** -0.0822*** -0.231***
Quarter 11 0.0605*** 0.0335*** -0.0464* -0.279***
Observations 53,540 49,337 3,654 549
Number of banks 5,955 5,488 406 61
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For medium banks, the TARP banks’ CTAs decrease by 5.49% during the treatment
quarter. In terms of a dollar amount, a dollar TARP investment can be translated
into 7.8 dollar more of credit for medium banks. And for big banks, there is an
annual increase of 7.28 percentage point in CTA. One dollar of TARP investment can
be translated into 1.25 dollar more in big banks’ credit.
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CHAPTER III
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Although a government safety net can help protect consumers and banks and prevent
or ameliorate the adverse shocks, like adverse events and financial crisis, it is a mixed
blessing. The most serious drawback of the government safety net stems from moral
hazard. For example, when consumers encounter adverse events like divorce or a large
medical bill, the option of bankruptcy as their last resort provides increased incentives
for manipulating their debts which results in a maximized financial benefit from filing.
Knowing the government will not leave them to fail, financial institutions(banks) have
an incentive to take on greater risks than they otherwise would, with taxpayers paying
the bill if the bank subsequently goes belly up. Financial institutions have been given
the following bet: “Heads I win, tails the taxpayers loses”.
Chapter I investigates consumers’ bankruptcy choice with the law of bankruptcy
as their last resort. In the literature, two theories, adverse events theory and strate-
gic timing theory, have received particular attention. It is important to distinguish
which theory is true, because each theory is based on different assumptions on con-
sumer behavior, and each theory implies potentially different policy responses to
reduce bankruptcy filings. If adverse events theory is correct, and if it is determined
that bankruptcy filings are too high, then policies to reduce bankruptcy filings could
include measures that minimize the impact of adverse events, or increase financial
education program for planning for such events. And if strategic timing theory is
correct, then policies to reduce filings could include tighten access to bankruptcy
courts, make bankruptcy more expensive, lower exemptions divert more debtors to
longer repayment plans, lengthen minimum time between repeat filings and require
debt management programs outside of bankruptcy.
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At the heart of each theory is the role of financial benefit in the bankruptcy filing
decision.
In the “strict” interpretation, strategic timing theory holds, if, ceteris paribus,
filing benefit affects the bankruptcy decision positively, and adverse events theory
holds, if, ceteris paribus, adverse events variables affect a consumer’s decision to file.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Fay, Hurst, and White
(2002), (henceforth, FHW,) show that financial benefit is positively and significantly
related to the filing decision, and after controlling for financial benefit, adverse events
variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision (except for a marginally significant
positive effect of divorce). The strict interpretation implicitly assumes that strategic
behavior is the only behavior affecting financial benefit.
In this chapter, we propose that even when financial benefit may affect the filing
decision in either theory, the inclusion of financial benefit as an optimizing variable
is a testable difference between the two theories. In other words, strategic consumers
may additionally manipulate debt before filing, but adverse events consumers do not.
We formalize this distinction by inquiring whether financial benefit is exogenous or
endogenous to the filing decision. The discussions provide a set of natural instru-
mental variables, the adverse events. Using both PSID data and SCF data, we show
that financial benefit is exogenous to the bankruptcy decision, consistent with adverse
events theory. With both datasets, the coefficient on financial benefit from filing is
strongly significantly positive. To inquire into the possibility of both types of behav-
ior existing simultaneously, we extend the analysis by estimating a regime-switching
model with two types. We find evidence of heterogeneity in types consistent with both
behavior. In particular, financial benefit is shown to be endogenous for the strategic
type, and exogenous for the adverse events type. The coefficient on financial benefit
is significantly positive for the strategic type and insignificant for the adverse event
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type.
To inquire into the possibility of both types of behavior existing simultaneously,
we extend the analysis by estimating a model with two unobserved types. We find
evidence of heterogeneity in types consistent with both behavior. In particular, finan-
cial benefit is shown to be endogenous for the strategic type, and exogenous for the
adverse events type. The coefficient on financial benefit is significantly positive for
the strategic type and positive but insignificant for the adverse events type. These
results show a role for both hypotheses.
Chapter II explore the effect of government’s bailout program on banks during
the crisis. The moral hazard created by the government safety net and the desire
to prevent financial institution failures have presented financial regulators with a
particular quandary. Because the failure of a very large financial institution makes
it more likely that a major financial disruption will occur, financial regulators are
naturally reluctant to allow a big institution to fail and cause losses to its depositors
and creditors.
Although it is not only the “big” banks that get TARP investments, there is a
difference between the big TARP banks and other TARP banks. I observe a signifi-
cantly lower leverage ratio in big TARP banks than the non-TARP banks in the same
size category, but a higher leverage ratio in TARP banks than non-TARP banks in
other size categories. It implies that the Treasury’s choice of TARP investment are
not just the “healthy” banks as claimed. The last thing the government wants to see
is a failure of a big bank and the domino effects coming after. In order to stabilize the
economy, it is wise to save the big banks from failing. On the other hand, there is a
“certification effect” of TARP investments among the banks in other size categories,
since the Treasury would like to have a positive return or at least not too much losses
for the taxpayers. Thus it is a positive signal if a bank in this category gets TARP.
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Moreover, I discover that there is a heterogeneous effect of TARP on these two
sizes of banks in terms of loan growth. The smaller banks have positive and significant
growth in loans no matter they were well-capitalized or under-capitalized. However,
the big banks do not use the money in lending out, i.e., they sit on the money and
try to shore up their capital base.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis quantifying
TARP’s effect on banks’ LTA with panel data. It is related and complementary
to several recent works. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2009) study the allocation of
TARP capital to public banks, which account for less than 10% of all commercial
banks in the US. Taliaferro (2009) studies banks’ self-selection into TARP based on
bank characteristics only, and examines capital structure decisions of TARP banks by
comparing TARP banks with matched non-TARP banks. Duchin and Sosyura (2011)
study the political and regulatory influences on TARP funds distribution. There are
two major differences between this chapter and the paper mentioned above. First,
the panel data allow us to check the dynamic effect of LTA adjustment over time.
Second, my models and specifications are more complete by controlling for not only
bank characteristics, local economic conditions and time trend, but also the history
influence and endogeneity of TARP decision.
This chapter contributes to the literature of financial and banking crisis. Banking
crisis have significant negative effects on real economy, especially on sectors dependent
on bank financing (Kronzner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache,
and Rajan, 2008). This effect can be largely attributed to the reduction in banks’
credit supply in the economy, which could be a result of “capital crunch” of banks
(Bernanke and Lown 1991). In this chapter, I test if the injection of capital can boost
banks’ LTA during crisis.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix presents the joint density of log of (bank, ln(fb + 1)) if both adverse
event type and the strategic type people are potentially present but unobserved. The
join density (file, ln(fb+ 1)) is given by:
f(file, ln(fb+ 1)|X,AE,W )
= f((file, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 1, X,AE,W )Pr(T = 1|X,AE,W )
+ f((file, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 2, X,AE,W )Pr(T = 2|X,AE,W )
We assume that the set of W is such that Pr(T = 1|X,AE,W ) = Pr(T = 1|W ) =
Φ(Wα), and f((file, ln(fb+1))|T = 1, X,AE,W ) = f((file, ln(fb+1))|T = 1, X,AE).
In other words, the set of W only affects of probability of being in one of the two
types. It does not affect conditional joint density of (file, ln(fb+ 1)|T ).
The join density of (file, ln(fb+1)) consists four observed cases, (file = 1, ln(fb+
1) = 0), (file = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0), (file = 1, ln(fb+ 1)), and (file = 0, ln(fb+ 1)).
Pr(file = 1, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)
= Pr((file = 1, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)|T = 1)Pr(T = 1)
+ Pr((file = 1, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)|T = 2)Pr(T = 2)
= Φ(Wα) ∗
∫ −Xδ1−µ1AE
−∞
Φ(
Xβ1 + θ1v1√
1− θ21σ2v1
)
1
σv1
φ
v1
σv1
dv1
+ (1− Φ(Wα)) ∗ Φ(Xβ2) ∗ Φ(−Xδ2 + φ2AE
σv2
)
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Similary,
Pr(file = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)
= Pr((file = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)|T = 1)Pr(T = 1)
+ Pr((file = 0, ln(fb+ 1) = 0)|T = 2)Pr(T = 2)
= Φ(Wα) ∗
∫ −Xδ1−µ1AE
−∞
Φ(−Xβ1 + θ1v1√
1− θ21σ2v1
)
1
σv1
φ
v1
σv1
dv1
+ (1− Φ(Wα)) ∗ (1− Φ(Xβ2)) ∗ Φ(−Xδ2 + φ2AE
σv2
)
Additionally,
Pr(file = 1, ln(fb+ 1))
= Pr((file = 1, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 1)Pr(T = 1)
+ Pr((file = 1, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 2)Pr(T = 2)
= Φ(Wα) ∗ Φ(Xβ1 + γ1ln(fb+ 1) + θ1(ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ1 − µ1AE)√
1− θ21σ2v1
)
∗ 1
σv1
φ(
ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ1 − µ1AE
σv1
)
+ (1− Φ(Wα)) ∗ Φ(Xβ2 + γ2ln(fb+ 1)) ∗ 1
σv2
∗ φ( ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ2 − µ2AE
σv2
)
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And finally,
Pr(file = 0, ln(fb+ 1))
= Pr((file = 0, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 1)Pr(T = 1)
+ Pr((file = 0, ln(fb+ 1))|T = 2)Pr(T = 2)
= Φ(Wα) ∗ (1− Φ(Xβ1 + γ1ln(fb+ 1) + θ1(ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ1 − µ1AE)√
1− θ21σ2v1
))
∗ 1
σv1
φ(
ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ1 − µ1AE
σv1
)
+ (1− Φ(Wα)) ∗ (1− Φ(Xβ2 + γ2ln(fb+ 1)))
∗ 1
σv2
∗ φ( ln(fb+ 1)−Xδ2 − µ2AE
σv2
)
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